Campaign for a Moral, Balanced Immigration Overhaul (CAMBIO)

Strategic Review

as revised, November 2014

By:

Anita Khashu
Consultant
anita.khashu@gmail.com

Kathleen M. Sullivan
Consultant
kmariesullivan@gmail.com
# Table of Contents

Section I. Introduction and Methodology

1.1. Scope of the Review ................................................................. 4
1.2. Data Collection Methodology ...................................................... 5
1.3. Limitations .................................................................................. 6

Section 2. Key Findings ...................................................................... 6

Section 3. Background on Enforcement-Reform Efforts and Establishment of CAMBIO ................................................ 11

3.1. Major Expansion of Immigration Enforcement and Response of Immigrant-Led Organizations 11
3.2. Congressional Inaction on Comprehensive Reform, but Immigrant Influence Grows ............... 12
3.3. State Action and Immigrant Community Reaction ................................................................. 13
3.4. One Movement, But Divided .................................................................. 13
3.5. The Establishment of CAMBIO .................................................................... 14
3.6. CAMBIO’s Purpose .......................................................................... 16
3.7. CAMBIO’s Structure and Operations ............................................................ 16

Section 4. CAMBIO’s Contribution to the 2013 CIR Fight in the Senate ......................................................... 17

4.1. CAMBIO Activity Prior to the Release of a Bill by the Senate’s “Gang of Eight” ...................... 17
4.2. Activities After the Gang of Eight Unveiled Draft CIR Legislation in April 2013 ................. 18
4.3. Outcomes of CAMBIO’s Work on the Senate’s 2013 CIR Legislation ................................. 19
4.4. Flaws of S. 744 .................................................................................... 20
4.5. Impact of CAMBIO Activities on S. 744 .............................................................................. 20

Section 5. CAMBIO’s Contribution on Border Issues ................................................................................. 21

5.1. CAMBIO’s Border-Related Activities ................................................................................. 21
5.2. Outcomes of CAMBIO-Related Border Activities ............................................................... 24

Section 6. CAMBIO’s Efforts to Counter the SAFE Act ........................................................................ 29

6.1. CAMBIO’s SAFE-Related Activities ................................................................. 29
6.2. Outcomes of CAMBIO’s Advocacy on SAFE ...................................................................... 30

Section 7. Additional Findings on CAMBIO’s General Impact .............................................................. 34

7.1. Collective Voice Improves Members’ Access and Influence in DC ........................................ 34
7.2. Strengthened Coordination and Collaboration of Enforcement-Focused Organizations ........ 35
7.3. Media Visibility ..................................................................................... 37

Section 8. Influence of CAMBIO on the Broader Immigration-Reform Campaign ........................................ 38
### 8.1. CAMBIO’s Influence on “Mainstream” Immigration Campaigns and Organizations ..........39

### 8.2. Unanticipated Negative Consequences of Forming an Enforcement Campaign ...................42

### 8.3. Value-Added of Forming a Campaign Focused on Enforcement Provisions of CIR .................43

#### Section 9. Value to Members, Strategic Partners, and Allies ........................................45

- **9.1. CAMBIO Staff** ........................................................................................................46
- **9.2. Convening of Steering Committee Members with One Another, and with Allies** ..........47
- **9.3. CAMBIO’s Government Relations/Lobbying Consultants** ..................................48
- **9.4. Communications Resources** ..................................................................................51
- **9.5. Legislative Resources** ..........................................................................................53

#### Section 10. Assessment of CAMBIO Challenges and Future Needs ........................................54

- **10.1. Shared Purpose and Goals/Strategic Alignment** .....................................................54
- **10.2. Make-Up of Membership** ....................................................................................59
- **10.3. Set-Up and Launch** .............................................................................................61
- **10.4. Group Dynamics** ................................................................................................62
- **10.5. Group Ground-Rules** ..........................................................................................62
- **10.6. Meetings of Steering Committee Members** .........................................................63
- **10.7. Resources** ..........................................................................................................64
- **10.8. Field Work** .........................................................................................................65
- **10.9 Summary of CAMBIO “Lessons Learned”** ............................................................65
- **10.10. Future Needs** ..................................................................................................68

#### Appendices ......................................................................................................................70

- **A. List of Informants** ....................................................................................................70
Section 1: Introduction and Methodology

In March 2014, Campaign for an Accountable, Moral, and Balanced Immigration Reform (CAMBIO) commissioned us to conduct an external review of the CAMBIO campaign. This report summarizes findings based on data gathered during an in-person focus group conducted with members of the CAMBIO Steering Committee in May 2014; a review of approximately 20 CAMBIO corporate documents and 36 internal meeting minutes; and 41 semi-structured telephone interviews conducted principally in June and July 2014.1

1.1 Scope of the Review

Prior to securing our consultant services, CAMBIO staff and its principal funders created a document outlining the purpose and scope of the proposed review. This document listed the following objectives of the review:

1. Assess and capture CAMBIO’s successes and accomplishments to date;
2. Understand the value – as well as any potential drawbacks or tradeoffs – of funding work to address issues focused on enforcement of immigration laws and humane treatment of immigrants in the context of concurrent efforts focused on passage of CIR policy; and
3. Extract lessons learned from the CAMBIO “experiment,” from its formation as a coalition to the implementation of its collective efforts, and provide recommendations for the future including possible future direction, structure and membership/composition, purpose, etc.

The scoping document also contained a list of nine learning questions to frame the review.

Given the broad scope of CAMBIO’s work, we realized upon starting our research that a full exploration of all nine proposed research questions could not be undertaken credibly within the limitations of the resources available to the review. Therefore, a key initial task was to design a set of research questions that would produce the depth and breadth of data on all topics that would make well-grounded findings possible. To accomplish this, we conducted a series of interviews with CAMBIO staff; its fiscal sponsor; and the members of a review committee that we constituted with the assistance of CAMBIO staff. (The review committee was comprised of two staff members, one funder, and four CAMBIO Steering Committee members.) We obtained from these informants background information about the campaign that permitted us to recommend a narrowing of the review’s scope. This recommendation was agreed to by the review committee. The amended plan focused the review the following set of research questions.

1. Has the CAMBIO campaign’s focus on enforcement raised awareness of inhumane enforcement in a way that helped shape policymakers’ thinking about CIR or administrative reforms, or that advanced their commitment to reforms?

---

1 For a list of informants, their organizations and organizations’ acronyms, and informants’ categorization for citation purposes, see Appendix A.
2. Did an enforcement-oriented campaign mechanism result in “mainstream” immigration campaigns and organizations relating differently to enforcement issues than they had in the past?

3. What elements of CAMBIO’s activities and services have members found most valuable to their organizations’ or community’s immigration reform efforts?

4. What have been the overall successes and accomplishments of the CAMBIO campaign mechanism to date?

5. Have there been any unanticipated consequences – positive or negative – of forming the coalition and investing in enforcement rather than in the main CIR campaign?

6. What lessons can be learned for future immigration reform campaigns from challenges that CAMBIO experienced in undertaking its work? How could internal and external barriers to achievement more effectively be addressed in future campaigns?

1.2 Data Collection Methodology

**Document review.** We reviewed and analyzed approximately 20 CAMBIO-related documents, including grant proposals and reports, documents summarizing accomplishments and/or activities, messaging reports, and documents explaining campaign structure and processes. We also reviewed meeting minutes from 36 Steering Committee meetings, workgroup meetings, or other internal meetings.

**In-person focus group.** We conducted a group interview with CAMBIO Steering Committee members during CAMBIO’s May 20, 2014, in-person meeting in Washington, DC. Thirteen CAMBIO member organization staff persons were present and two participated by telephone during this morning meeting, in total representing eight member organizations. The principal purpose of the evaluation session from our standpoint was to gather data for the review on CAMBIO’s accomplishments to date. In consultation with CAMBIO leadership, we also designed this evaluation session to provide a springboard for a leadership-led discussion about next steps for the campaign, which occurred that afternoon.

**Semi-structured phone interviews.** This evaluation employs a qualitative approach centered on semi-structured telephonic interviews of informants who we believed would be most familiar with CAMBIO’s work, and would provide a diverse range of perspectives. The flexibility of semi-structured interviews, which allowed us to adjust questioning based on the particular experience and knowledge of the interviewee, was beneficial for this project, given the wide range of experiences and intensities of engagement with CAMBIO amongst our informant pool. In total, we conducted 41 semi-structured phone interviews. The makeup of the informant pool was eight CAMBIO campaign staffers and consultants, sixteen representatives of Steering Committee member organizations, and seventeen external informants (including funders, legislative staffers, and CAMBIO strategic partners and other immigration-reform advocates) who we believed would be most familiar with CAMBIO’s work and its influence on the broader field. We interviewed at least one person from each CAMBIO member organization. Recommendations of staff, Steering Committee members, the review committee, and funders provided us with the pool of individuals from which external interviewees was selected.
1.3 Limitations

The data that are analyzed in this review have important limitations due to the characteristics of the environment and the review assignment. For example, we were aware of the range of potential analytical biases posed by our sampling methodology; but we felt it would not be possible to get meaningful data from a more neutral sampling methodology, such as randomization, particularly given our resource limitations. It also seemed essential to use this focused approach to interviewee selection because the majority of monitoring and evaluation data was not collected while the campaign was fully operational. Reviewers had to rely upon informants’ recollection of past events, which were not always clearly remembered. Another limitation of the review is the difficulty informants had with separating the impact resulting from CAMBIO from the impact of individual member organization’s independent efforts. We attempted to ameliorate this problem by including in the report an analysis of the “value-added” of CAMBIO activities and services to member organizations’ work.

Section 2: Key Findings

This section provide key findings relating to the framing/research questions for the review. Subsequent sections of the report we summarize the data upon which these findings were based.

1. Has the CAMBIO campaign’s focus on enforcement raised awareness of inhumane enforcement in a way that helped shape policymakers’ thinking about CIR or administrative reforms, or that advanced their commitment to reforms?

- CAMBIO’s Capitol Hill briefings and lobbying work contributed to preventing the SAFE Act from being the US House of Representative’s default immigration-reform vehicle.
- CAMBIO increased legislative offices’ awareness of immigration enforcement excesses and their devastating impact on communities, and provided legislators with information and resources that helped them to push back against pro-enforcement positions promoted by restrictionist colleagues.
- CAMBIO members and staff/consultants played a key role in high-level administration meetings on immigration reform, raising enforcement-related priorities that otherwise may have gone unrepresented: in particular, border enforcement issues. The Obama Administration recently announced that US Customs and Border Protection will reform its policies on responding to complaints of misconduct or excessive use of force, and it is planning to pilot the use of lapel cameras by border officers. While this occurred after our research period, we note that these are two of CAMBIO’s border priorities.

2. Did an enforcement-oriented campaign mechanism result in “mainstream” immigration campaigns and organizations relating differently to enforcement issues than they had in the past?

- CAMBIO spearheaded an opposition letter on the SAFE Act that 96 organizations signed onto, including the FIRM campaign, key members of the Alliance for Citizenship campaign, faith-based
reform advocates, national civil rights organizations, and major labor unions. In subsequent months, CAMBIO’s advocacy helped induce “mainstream” immigration-reform campaigns to pay greater attention to enforcement-reform issues, and to oppose the SAFE Act more vigorously than they might otherwise have done.

- CAMBIO focused mainstream advocates’ attention on the excessive border enforcement provisions (the Corker-Hoeven Amendment) in S. 744, the Senate’s 2013 comprehensive immigration legislation. In connection with this work, CAMBIO helped to develop and coordinate a strategy to ensure that Corker-Hoeven was not included in the immigration reform legislation offered by House Democrats.
- CAMBIO influenced several nationally prominent immigration reform actors to incorporate enforcement-related priorities in their overall immigration-reform messaging.
- CAMBIO influenced some mainstream immigration-reform advocacy groups to reconsider their use of problematic language relating to enforcement – for example, to stop using “we’re not criminals” messaging.
- CAMBIO was the “go-to” source for lobbying materials and other resources on immigration enforcement for other immigration-reform actors.

3. **What elements of CAMBIO’s activities and services have members found most valuable to their organizations’ or community’s immigration reform efforts?**

- Many Steering Committee informants highlighted the support they received from the experienced and highly skilled CAMBIO staff as a key value that CAMBIO brought to members’ work, principally by providing technical expertise in key campaign areas, legislative guidance, contacts that members would find it difficult to attain on their own, and logistical and convening support.
- Many Steering Committee informants (as well as Strategic Partners and allies) appreciated the assistance they received from government relations/lobbying consultants in obtaining Capitol Hill intelligence to inform members’ strategy development, targeting persuadable legislators (particularly Republicans), gaining access to legislative offices with which CAMBIO members did not have contacts, and tailoring messages and lobbying materials appropriate to legislators’ needs and concerns.
- CAMBIO Steering Committee members emphasized as particularly valuable CAMBIO’s financial and logistical assistance with, and advice on, setting up lobby days and meetings on Capitol Hill, and meetings with the Obama Administration.
- Polling, message development, press briefings, and other communications services, to create and disseminate pro-enforcement-reform lobbying and communications content to allies, policymakers, and the press, were also highly valued by CAMBIO members.
4. What have been the overall successes and accomplishments of the CAMBIO campaign mechanism to date?

- Bringing together CAMBIO members to learn about one another’s issues and to multiply one another’s access and influence through information-sharing, and undertaking joint lobbying and other collective policy-reform efforts. Having diversity of expertise within the CAMBIO membership permitted Steering Committee members to nuance their messages about enforcement-reform issues on which they themselves didn’t have substantive expertise.
- Creating and facilitating a space for CAMBIO members to share information and discuss joint strategy with other enforcement-reform advocates, as well as serving as a streamlined point of contact for legislative staff working on enforcement reform. Supporting affected community members to come to Washington to directly inform policymakers and their staffs about how excessive immigration enforcement harms immigrants and their families.
- Recruiting and supporting additional influential voices (such as law enforcement) to come to Washington to inform policymakers and their staffs about the ways in which excessive immigration enforcement regimes negatively impact local communities.
- Developing and providing local communities and DC-based advocates with information and resources on enforcement reform for use in enforcement-reform advocacy, community education, and organizing.
- Identifying non-traditional allies on Capitol Hill (particularly but not limited to Republicans) and working to persuade them to resist excessive, high-cost, immigration enforcement policies.

5. Have there been any unanticipated consequences – positive or negative – of forming the coalition and investing in enforcement rather than in the main CIR campaign?

- Almost all external informants believed there were no unintended negative consequences of forming CAMBIO on the broader campaign for immigration reform.
- An unanticipated negative consequence of the formulation of CAMBIO on the enforcement-reform field (as opposed to the immigrants’ rights movement) was the persistent view on the part of some CAMBIO critics that the formation and resourcing of a centralized CAMBIO campaign, with associated staffing and consultant services, diverted desperately needed funding from CAMBIO member organizations. The perceived funding competition aggravated inter-group tensions over the objectives of, and strategies for, collective action.
- We did not identify any unanticipated positive consequences of forming the campaign.

6. What lessons can be learned for future immigration reform campaigns from challenges that CAMBIO experienced in undertaking its work? How could internal and external barriers to achievement more effectively be addressed in future campaigns?

- CAMBIO suffered from a lack of alignment between member organizations about the main goals, strategic positioning, and scope of work of the campaign (i.e., securing enforcement reforms vs. enacting CIR; appealing to moderates or staking out more progressive positions;
limited to legislation, or also including administrative advocacy). Struggles based on these alignment problems consumed much time and energy of CAMBIO members and staff, and most likely limited the impact of the campaign.

> **Lessons learned:**
> - Members of future campaigns must have a uniform understanding of the campaign’s main goals, strategic positioning, and the scope of work that the campaign will and will not undertake (legislative, administrative, other).
> - The campaign must set out in detail and in writing its goals, strategic positioning, a scope of work, ground rules that will govern how decisions are made within the campaign, and how members will relate to one another.
> - The membership in any subsequent campaign should be selected on the basis of clear agreement with the campaign’s goals, strategic positioning, scope of work, and ground rules, and agreement should be memorialized through the signing of an MOU. A mechanism for members to discontinue participation should be agreed to.
> - Campaign members must be provided the opportunity and resources to come together before active campaign activities begin to build personal and organizational familiarity that can help to sustain trust in times of great stress and urgency.
> - “Strategic Partner” or similar status could be given to organizations that can serve as strategic allies for the campaign but that: (i) are not principally enforcement-reform advocates; or (ii) do not fully agree with the campaign’s positioning or ground rules.

- A minority of CAMBIO members criticized the availability and quality of resources they received from CAMBIO’s strategic and communications consultants. This appears to be related to the strategic targeting or alignment issues discussed above, combined with a related resource-limitation issue. It caused certain members to feel under-served and to value their participation in CAMBIO less.

> **Lessons learned:**
> - To be maximally effective, government relations and communications consultants must understand and be comfortable with the campaign’s strategic positioning, and become well-acquainted with the campaign’s membership before campaign activities are underway.
> - All agreed-upon campaign issues (for example, detention, or interior enforcement) that are strategically beneficial for accomplishing campaign goals should receive the benefit of the campaign’s messaging, lobbying, or other services.

- Enforcement-reform organizations did not form a campaign until the immigration-reform legislative process was well underway in the Senate in the winter of 2013, which limited CAMBIO’s early influence and momentum.
Lessons learned: Enforcement-reform advocates must be poised to form a campaign structure well in advance of potential major legislative activity, and foundations should be prepared to ramp up campaign support quickly.

The CAMBIO campaign had insufficient resources to support campaign operations and the Steering Committee members’ participation in the campaign. CAMBIO Steering Committee members’ non-campaign work and staff well-being suffered due to the very high number of hours that their staff dedicated to CAMBIO work. This caused some Steering Committee members to question their ability to participate in the campaign and the value to their organizations of doing so. Several informants (external as well as internal) identified that the lack of reliable ongoing resources for the campaign seriously impeded the campaign’s momentum and endangered its readiness for future legislative challenges.

Lessons learned:
- Campaign member organizations must receive sufficient direct support to permit them to staff their participation in the campaign without compromising their other organizational work.
- To maximize its impact, the campaign structure must obtain and maintain throughout its lifespan sufficient funding to maintain staffing, consultant, and other services.

CAMBIO’s need to have multiple meetings before key decisions were made frustrated and over-taxed members, sowed some distrust in the integrity of the deliberative process, and harmed CAMBIO’s ability to respond quickly in an urgent campaign environment. We believe this was principally a result of the campaign’s strategic alignment problems. In addition to securing member agreement on strategic alignment and ground rules:

Lessons learned:
- Members of subsequent campaigns should formally agree about how high-value meeting decisions (such as attendance at key policy meetings) will be made and communicated.
- Management of member organizations must dedicate staffing to the campaign at a high enough level to make timely and effective decisions, and member organizations must be resourced sufficiently to do this.

CAMBIO’s field activities faced significant challenges that CAMBIO could not meet robustly. It appears this was because CAMBIO members with strong field components incorporated their work with CAMBIO inconsistently, field grantees of Four Freedoms Fund focused their efforts on other priorities, and CAMBIO lacked the substantial staffing necessary to access the field independently.

Lessons learned:
- Future field-based work will require that the campaign establish and maintain strategic alignment with field-organizing members within the
campaign. Field-based members receiving campaign resources must agree to incorporate CAMBIO objectives into their ongoing priorities.

- Early and adequate funding will need to be provided to the campaign for a robust field organizing staff to identify organizations and coordinate field activities, and to field-based organizations themselves to permit their active participation in the campaign.

The next section of the report offers a brief summary of the history of immigration enforcement reform in the last several decades, and background on the formation of CAMBIO. The report then provides a description of CAMBIO's activities and outcomes relating to the 2013 Senate fight for comprehensive immigration reform, border enforcement policy reform, and the SAFE Act in the House of Representatives; followed by a summary of CAMBIO’s general impact on the immigration enforcement field, and influence on the broader immigration reform movement. Finally, the report provides feedback on specific CAMBIO services or activities, challenges faced, and lessons learned for future campaigns.

Section 3: Background on Enforcement-Reform Efforts and Establishment of CAMBIO

This section provides historical context for the establishment of CAMBIO and an overview of the campaign’s formation and structure. The first portion of this section describes a few elements that we consider important in the run-up to the creation of CAMBIO in 2013. Readers should note, however, that this section is not intended to provide an exhaustive summary of the history of immigration enforcement within the modern immigrants’ rights movement.

3.1 Major Expansion of Immigration Enforcement and Response of Immigrant-Led Organizations

Legislation enacted as part of the “war on drugs” in the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s provided the federal government with authority to expand immigration enforcement in local communities under the general guise of “crime control.” Foremost among these was legislation enacted in 1996, known best by its abbreviated name, “IIRIRA.” Among other things, IIRIRA authorized the “Secure Communities” program, which matches fingerprints provided by state and local authorities against various federal databases, and “287(g) agreements” with law enforcement authorities, which permit certain state and local law enforcement officers to enforce immigration laws.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the federal government began an unprecedented expansion of immigration enforcement, much of it on the basis of legislative authority from IIRIRA. For example, in 2002, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement started implementing 287(g) agreements with state

---

4 See Doris Meissner, Donald Kerwin, Muzaffar Chishti, and Claire Bergeron, Immigration Enforcement in the United States, the Rise of a Formidable Machinery (Migration Policy Institute, Jan. 2013) (cited as “Formidable Machinery”), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-machinery at 7 and generally, for an authoritative analysis of the build-up of immigration enforcement programs during this period.
and local law enforcement authorities. By 2008, over 50 such agreements had been signed. In 2008, US ICE implemented the Secure Communities program, which was operational in 97 percent of all US jurisdictions by 2012. Secure Communities was heralded by its proponents as a major effort to deport immigrants convicted of dangerous crimes. Far from making immigrant communities safer, however, the principal achievement of Secure Communities, according to independent analysts, has been to increase deportations of persons with traffic and immigration offenses. Federal legislation enacted in 2006 continued militarization efforts on the border, authorizing 700 additional miles of fencing, additional border lighting, and sensors, cameras and drones. In early 2013, the Migration Policy Institute concluded that the United States government spends more per year on its immigration enforcement agencies than all its other principal criminal law enforcement entities combined -- $18 billion.

Parallel to the massive expansion of immigration enforcement in the early 2000s, immigrant-led immigrant-based organizations worked for and obtained greater influence in immigration policy-advocacy. In addition to the DREAMers (discussed in the following paragraph), these included organizations such as DRUM in New York and Hate Free Zone (now OneAmerica) in Washington State, which were launched or substantially expanded to oppose targeting of specific immigrant communities after 9/11; immigrant-led state-wide or regional organizing and advocacy entities (such as Southeast Immigrants’ Rights Network (SEIRN) and Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC)); and groups organizing important sectors of immigrants, such as National Domestic Workers’ Alliance, and National Day Laborer Organizing Network.

3.2 Congressional Inaction on Comprehensive Reform, but Immigrant Influence Grows

Despite growing policy-reform pressure from the immigrant community and its allies in the mid-2000s, for many years Congress only took action on restrictionist bills. Of the many such introduced, the first to pass a chamber of Congress during this period was the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. The legislation, better known as the “Sensenbrenner bill” for its principal House sponsor, was not enacted into law. It immediately became infamous, however, for, among other things, seeking to criminalize unlawful presence in the United States.

The Sensenbrenner bill led to dozens of immigrant-led demonstrations across the country in the spring of 2006, including a demonstration on March 25th in Los Angeles that reportedly drew a half-million people. In late May 2006, the Senate passed S. 2611, the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act.” It included an earned legalization program and relief for undocumented youth (DREAM Act), but also authorized 370 miles of additional border fencing and enhanced interior enforcement of immigration.

---

7 Formidable Machinery at 9.
8 Watanabe, Teresa; Becerra, Hector, "500,000 Pack Streets to Protest Immigration Bills; The rally, part of a massive mobilization of immigrants and their supporters, may be the largest L.A. has seen." Los Angeles Times: A1 (March 26, 2006).
9 The DREAM Act initially was introduced in 2001 in the 107th United States Congress, and has been re-introduced in various iterations and under various names in the 108th, 109th, 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses.
law. Its prospects ended with the close of the 109th Congress in January 2007. In the spring of that year a group of Senators led by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), and Republican Senators John McCain (Arizona), John Cornyn (Texas) and Lindsey Graham (South Carolina), spearheaded legislation that similarly contained earned legalization, DREAM, and border/interior enforcement provisions. The bill did not survive a cloture vote on the floor of the Senate, and effectively died on June 28, 2007.

In the fall of 2010, the House of Representatives considered DREAM Act legislation that would have provided lawful immigration status to individuals who arrived in the United States as children, completed a high school education in the United States, and attended college or served in the US military. The DREAM Act passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 216-198. Although it was not approved in the US Senate, the passage by the House, after almost a decade of organizing, leadership development, and policy-advocacy by undocumented youth at the local, state, and national levels, was an indication of the political clout of the DREAMers, and their colleague organizers and advocates. In the face of congressional inaction on DREAM, on June 15, 2012, the Obama Administration established the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Program, providing temporary status for certain noncitizens who arrived in the United States as children. Advocacy by DREAMers and their allies also resulted in several states expanding in-state tuition to immigrant youth.

3.3 State Action and Immigrant Community Reaction

While Congress failed to act to protect immigrants’ rights, restrictionist state legislators seized the opportunity to take the country in the opposite direction. In 2010, Arizona enacted the law known popularly as SB-1070, which, among other things, broadly authorized law enforcement to make arrests for any immigration violation, and outlawed employment by unauthorized immigrants. The states of Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Utah, and South Carolina followed suit with restrictionist laws in 2011. While similar proposals were made in 2012 in five mostly “red” states, immigrants’ rights groups held off further waves of restrictionist laws. In addition to successful litigation assistance and community-support efforts by national organizations such as the ACLU and NILC, base-building groups including NDLON and NDWA rallied affected communities and put pressure on the Obama Administration to vigorously oppose restrictionist legislation both in courts and in the political arena.

Momentum built by intensive immigrant organizing in many states, combined with these national efforts, turned the tide in favor of progressive immigration proposals, at least in many “blue” states. By the end of 2013, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, New Mexico, Utah and Washington had laws on the books extending driver’s license eligibility to

10 CAMBIO member National Immigration Law Center had taken the lead in the early 2000s to work with immigrants’ rights organizations and youth organizers across the country to support organizing and leadership development of the new generation of young immigrants, who, a bit more than a decade later, secured DACA.
11 Information on DACA is available at http://www.weownthedream.org/.
12 Information on tuition equity laws is available at http://unitedwedream.org/about/projects/education-deep/.
14 ACLU, NILC, NDLON, and NDWA became Steering Committee members of CAMBIO in 2013.
undocumented immigrants. A total of fifteen states provided tuition equity for unauthorized immigrant students.

3.4 One Movement, But Divided

A number of national campaign entities from different corners of the immigration community were formed to advocate for pro-immigrant legislation in 2006-2007 (comprehensive reform) and 2010 (DREAM Act).\(^{15}\) Arguably the most influential among these was Reform Immigration For America, or RI4A,\(^{16}\) comprised of, among others, major labor unions, the National Council of La Raza, America’s Voice, the Center for American Progress, and the American Immigration Lawyers’ Association.

Despite RI4A’s public stance that it broadly represented pro-immigrant interests in immigration reform, RI4A was not an effective vehicle for promoting enforcement reform in immigration-overhaul legislation, according to our informants. Enforcement-reform organizations that were RI4A members also had other major objectives in immigration reform, such as earned legalization, which spread their energies too thinly for effective action. RI4A resisted the efforts of enforcement-reform-specific organizations, some of which did not take a position on legalization, to participate actively in RI4A’s strategic development. A number of informants saw RI4A and other “mainstream” campaigns as being willing to “trade-off” heightened immigration enforcement for legalization or a path to citizenship, although some informants suggested that RI4A’s lack of focus on enforcement-reform was due less to lack of sympathy with the issues, and more because, in those years, its members did not feel that enforcement-reform issues carried political power.

At least in part due to a lack of alignment between the interests of “mainstream” advocates and enforcement-reform groups (including immigrant-community-based and immigrant-led groups), only limited support was available during this period for national-level messaging and communications work to guide strategy development by enforcement-reform advocates. It does not appear from our data that most enforcement-reform groups (other than those that participated in “mainstream” immigration-reform campaigns) had access to government relations/lobbying consultants.

3.5 The Establishment of CAMBIO

By the time that President Obama won re-election in November 2012, the pro-immigration-reform landscape had shifted, at least to some extent. Immigrant communities increasingly were feeling the pain of local immigration enforcement, which, combined with a deportation system that lacked discretion, resulted in the separation of thousands of families each year. Immigrants’ rights champions read the election results, including turnout of Latino voters, as a sign that comprehensive reforms were possible. Due to the policy achievements of the DREAMers, the success of local communities, immigrant-led organizations, and other advocates at stopping the spread of SB-1070-type laws, and the


\(^{16}\) RI4A’s successor Web site is at http://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/?view=featured. RI4A was the successor to the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, or CCIR, whose legacy Web site is at http://www.cirnow.org/content/en/about_ccir.htm.
effectiveness of efforts to push back against Secure Communities and immigration detainers, enforcement-reform interests had achieved some colorable political clout, at least in progressive or centrist circles. (Several informants to our study and other data suggest, however, that many Republicans, particularly in the House, showed little indication then as now that they are open to enforcement reform.)

In another shift, the legacy-RI4A groups decided very early in their new incarnation as the Alliance for Citizenship (A4C) campaign to concentrate almost exclusively on pathway to citizenship issues. A4C’s decision in the fall of 2012, and the somewhat moderating policy climate, created an opening for enforcement-reform groups to come together in an effort to influence immigration reform legislation more robustly.

In the latter half of 2012, many state-level and national-level immigrants’ rights organizations focused on reforming the immigration enforcement system were in conversation with one another about how to engage with the comprehensive immigration reform process in Congress and to what extent coordination or collaboration would factor into their plans. Informant interviews suggest that several important conversations were going forward simultaneously. In one strand, Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR), Detention Watch Network (DWN), Rights Working Group (RWG), and The Advocates for Human Rights led an effort for a proposed enforcement caucus that would have brought together a large group of organizations active on border, interior, and other enforcement issues. (This proposed grouping included many organizations that later would become CAMBIO Steering Committee members and strategic partners.) The goal of the caucus agreed to by participants in the enforcement caucus conversations, according to informants, was to serve as a coordination and information-dissemination mechanism on pending immigration legislation. They intended to secure commitments from allies on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to reform the country’s enforcement regime in the longer term through ongoing dialog and capacity-building of enforcement-reform coalitions, which they believed would permit them to respond more robustly and collectively to excessive enforcement. The consensus of the enforcement caucus was to refrain from forming a short-term legislative campaign, in part, according to one informant, due to an expectation that caucus members would be undertaking their own legislative work.

Also during this time, a group of organizations that partially overlapped with the enforcement caucus, including NILC, the ACLU, and the NDWA, as well as several of the enforcement caucus conveners (DWN, RWG, and BNHR) were in discussions about the benefits of forming a short-term legislative campaign. Several of these groups initially expressed reluctance to join such a campaign, in part because of their skepticism over the possibility of accomplishing anything more in Congress than simply holding the line against increased interior enforcement. Other organizations, however, felt strongly about the need to fully engage in CIIR advocacy to push back on further expansion of enforcement programs, as well as to take advantage of the opportunity to mitigate problematic aspects of the current enforcement system and ensure that the broadest group of aspiring citizens would be eligible for any legalization program.

---

17 Information about the Alliance for Citizenship is at http://web.cof.org/2013Annual/docs/AllianceforCitizenship.pdf.
As these advocacy organizations were having their own conversations, national immigrants’ rights funders came together to discuss the need to support enforcement campaigns within the larger constellation of comprehensive immigration reform efforts. In December 2012, program officers from leading immigrants’ rights foundations coalesced around the desirability of funding an enforcement-reform campaign structure specifically, due both to their own assessments of the policy-reform opportunities, and because their institutions’ funding priorities favored a formal campaign approach.

Finally, with the time short to get an agreed-upon enforcement-reform mechanism up and running, National Immigration Law Center (NILC), a leading enforcement-reform advocate as well as a veteran of previous immigration-reform campaigns, was asked by immigrants’ rights funders to bring together the different strains of enforcement-reform conversations and to launch a more formalized campaign structure. The resulting entity, CAMBIO, held its initial meetings in late January 2013.

3.6 CAMBIO’s Purpose

CAMBIO Mission Statement, available on its Web site, gives the high-level view of CAMBIO’s purpose:

CAMBIO is a diverse group of organizations advocating for laws and policies that create a fair system for immigrants to become citizens; bans indefinite detention; allows due process for all Americans; makes enforcement systems accountable; protects civil and human rights; encourages a better border to protect the quality of life in the borderlands, prevents the abuse of vulnerable Americans; and keeps families together.18

Other internal documents define CAMBIO as a campaign “comprised of leaders of 13 organizations committed to an enforcement campaign in CIR.”19

3.7 CAMBIO’s Structure and Operations

CAMBIO’s structure. CAMBIO was comprised of 13 “member” organizations. Member organizations formed CAMBIO’s Steering Committee. The Steering Committee “define[d] positioning, goals, legislative priorities, and campaign strategies” of CAMBIO, approved any changes in CAMBIO’s structure, and decided which organizations would be invited to join CAMBIO as members or Strategic Partners.20 By the late spring of 2013, in addition to NILC, BNHR, RWG, and DWN, Steering Committee members of CAMBIO were the national American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Immigrant Justice Network (IJN), National Domestic Workers’ Alliance (NWDA), National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), National Guestworker Alliance (NWG), Northern Borders Coalition, Southern Borders Community Coalition (SBCC), and United We Dream (UWDN).

Strategic Partners were the second principal constituency of CAMBIO. According to CAMBIO forming documents, partners were organizations

---

18 See http://cambio-us.org/home/.
19 CAMBIO Roles and Structure (undated, 2013).
with which CAMBIO may want to coordinate with and engage with more formally. Partner organizations share CAMBIO’s values and may either bring lobbying capacity, increased influence on Capitol Hill, or strengthen field strength. Partners combine forces with CAMBIO to move specific targets. Partners participate in and share their views during Working Group meetings, but their organizations are not given a vote on the final decisions.\(^{21}\)

Strategic Partners of CAMBIO included major immigrants’ rights, civil rights, and faith-based organizations engaged in enforcement reform.

**CAMBIO’s operations.** The daily work of CAMBIO Steering Committee members was undertaken through three Working Groups -- Legislative, Communications, and Field -- reportable to the Steering Committee as a whole. Steering Committee members with particular interest or expertise served as Working Group “Leads.” On specific substantive issues, CAMBIO members worked with Strategic Partners and other allies though four substantive “tables”: Due Process and Judicial Discretion, Border, Workers’ Rights, and Detention and Removal.

**CAMBIO staff and outside consultants.** The work of CAMBIO members was supported by a central campaign staff. When fully constituted in the fall of 2013, the campaign staff consisted of a Campaign Manager, Border Liaison, Campaign Coordinator, Campaign Assistant, Communications Coordinator, and Senior Strategic Advisor.

The bipartisan Washington lobbying and communications firm Quinn Gillespie and Associates (QGA) served as CAMBIO’s political strategists and lobbyists. QGA also provided communications consulting services to CAMBIO during the early months of the campaign. As described in subsection 9.4, Fenton Communications succeeded QGA as communications consultants in the fall of 2013.

The activities undertaken by CAMBIO and the services provided to the campaign by its staff and consultants are described in detail in subsequent sections of this report.

**Section 4: CAMBIO’s Contribution to the 2013 CIR Fight in the Senate \(^{22}\)**

The collective impact of CAMBIO as a campaign entity on the US Senate’s 2013 comprehensive reform legislation (S. 744) was modest, because CAMBIO was not fully constituted until Senate consideration of comprehensive reform was well underway. As described in this section, the majority of internal informants to our review felt that CAMBIO partners and their allies, and not CAMBIO itself, should be credited with influencing the Senate to pass the only comprehensive immigration reform legislation in recent years that did not increase interior enforcement.

**4.1 CAMBIO Activity Prior to the Release of a Bill by the Senate’s “Gang of Eight”**

CAMBIO’s first planning meeting did not take place until January 20, 2013, when key members of the US Senate were already deeply engaged in the process of developing immigration reform legislation. The

\(^{21}\) *CAMBIO Roles and Structure* (undated, 2013).

\(^{22}\) Information on CAMBIO activities was mostly gathered from a review of CAMBIO grant reports, meeting minutes, and other internal documents, but was supplemented through interview data.
week after that initial CAMBIO planning meeting, a bipartisan group of senators (the “Gang of Eight”) announced a set of principles on immigration reform that would serve as a blueprint for drafting legislation. While CAMBIO as a campaign entity obviously did not influence the drafting of these principles, between the November 2012 presidential election and the announcement of the Senate Gang of Eight principles, CAMBIO Steering Committee members were actively engaged in advocacy with the Gang of Eight, as well as other key senators, to influence the drafting of the principles and legislation.

After and before the principles were released, CAMBIO members actively monitored and analyzed the Senate bill as it developed, and lobbied policymakers, key allies, and the general public. But the campaign’s collective activity was minimal, even in the early days of CAMBIO’s formal existence, because the campaign had yet to be fully funded, and members were still in the process of planning the campaign, hiring a campaign manager, and defining campaign priorities and a campaign structure. However, during this period of time, CAMBIO members were in regular contact with one another, sharing information and ideas about strategy during CAMBIO planning meetings and in their other encounters.

In the early spring of 2013, in the course of this preparatory work, several members expressed urgency around the need for polling data to support individual organizations’ advocacy in the Senate. The Ford Foundation offered to directly pay for a public opinion research firm to work with CAMBIO to avoid delays during the grant-approval process, and CAMBIO partners selected Belden Russonello Strategists (BRS), a firm that several CAMBIO members had worked with in the past. In the following months, CAMBIO Steering Committee members used the findings from this research, which reaffirmed the public’s support for many of CAMBIO priorities, in their advocacy with policymakers and other advocates engaged in the immigration reform debate.

At the end of March 2013, after CAMBIO had hired a campaign manager and received commitment for 501(c)(3) funding, the campaign held a launch meeting where the groups further refined campaign priorities and its campaign plan.

### 4.2 Activities after the Gang of Eight Unveiled Draft CIR Legislation in April 2013

The Senate’s Gang of Eight unveiled S. 744 on April 16, 2013. Having recently been launched, CAMBIO undertook legislative, field, and communications activities that may have influenced deliberations on S. 744. Among its legislative efforts, CAMBIO held briefings and other education activities during the Senate’s consideration that were aimed at influencing the amendment process:

- CAMBIO hosted a briefing for Senate Judiciary Committee staff to share the BRS polling findings, and to introduce CAMBIO as the go-to expert on immigration enforcement issues. The briefing was attended by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s rapid-response team responsible for responding to amendments during mark-up of the legislation by the Committee.

---

23 CAMBIO did not receive its 501(c)(4) funding until July 2013.
During the Judiciary Committee’s work on the bill, CAMBIO created and distributed action alerts and press statements aimed at preventing certain “poison pill” amendments from being included, and to support amendments containing CAMBIO priorities.

CAMBIO hosted a briefing on immigration for Senate staffers in June 2013. The briefing covered the criminalization of immigrants, due process, border security, detention, and workers’ rights.

Through a sub-grant to American Civil Liberties Union, CAMBIO supported constituent engagement using patch-through calling, designed to help constituents of members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to encourage their senators to oppose immigration reform amendments contrary to CAMBIO’s goals.

In order to influence the public debate on CAMBIO priorities, CAMBIO hosted several telephonic briefings for members of the media.

In the last days of consideration of the Senate bill, CAMBIO worked on getting into Sen. Reid’s list of priority amendments a provision on strengthening the border commission provided for in the legislation. Unfortunately, the whole amendment process got shut down by the Republicans’ unwillingness to reach an agreement on what amendments would come to a vote.

CAMBIO hosted a national field call in June 2013 focused on the outcome of the Senate bill.

CAMBIO created an infographic on the border that was retweeted by the Center for American Progress, Fox News Latino, member organizations, reporters, and activists.

### 4.3 Outcomes of CAMBIO’s Work on the Senate’s 2013 CIR Legislation

S. 744 was the only immigration reform bill considered by the full US Senate in recent history that did not seek to increase interior enforcement. One national policy expert stated: “In terms of interior, it was the cleanest bill we ever had. Meaning that it didn’t do much of anything to expand criminalization of immigration.” [External informant] One CAMBIO Steering Committee member summarized the gains in S. 744 as follows:

> There are provisions on access to counsel for vulnerable populations. The various bars and obstacles to people getting status, [it] fixes some of those. Good language on detention: improving standards/requiring compliance with standards, eliminat[ing] detention for vulnerable populations--folks have been working on this for a long time, first time it appeared in legislation. It was a big bill . . . everybody was really pleased, so much of working on crafting language got in. [Member]

According to CAMBIO staff, its efforts during the amendment process contributed to successfully keeping amendments out of the legislation that would have restricted a modest attempt to restore discretion to immigration judges (Grassley Amendments Nos. 21 and 22) and would have required DHS to consult with crime victims before granting a waiver or application for registered provisional immigrant (“RPI”) status (Cornyn Amendment No. 4).
4.4 Flaws of S. 744

S. 744 was approved by the US Senate on June 27, 2013. In the final days of the Senate immigration reform negotiations, policymakers added the Corker-Hoeven Amendment. Corker-Hoeven called for significantly increased militarization of the border, including a doubling of the number of border patrol agents, and increased expenditures for border fencing and the use of drones in border communities, for a total increase in border enforcement spending of $46 billion. While this amendment was a severe loss for the CAMBIO partners, through Corker-Hoeven, CAMBIO managed to include a couple of border priorities, such as rescue beacons that would be placed along the southern border to help prevent migrant deaths, and a requirement that DHS start reporting and monitoring migrant deaths in the desert. Additional border priorities included in the final bill were a border oversight commission, a limitation on the “drone zone,” and a cutting of the 100-mile constitution-free zone at the northern border. [Staff/consultant]

Obviously there was a great deal of complex calculation within the Senate that resulted in the many disappointing features of Corker-Hoeven, particularly for border advocates. It is only speculative whether CAMBIO could have stemmed this tide, or influenced it more robustly, had it been completely staffed, and/or had access to 501(c)(4) funding (which did not become available until July), throughout the entirety of Senate consideration.

4.5 Impact of CAMBIO Activities on S. 744

It is unclear from our data the amount of impact that CAMBIO had on S. 744, versus the impact of CAMBIO member organizations’ independent work. What is apparent is that CAMBIO was still in the process of building its infrastructure during the Senate process, and it had yet to secure funding for a lobbyist, which limited the resources that CAMBIO as an entity could bring to bear on collective planning or action. It is also clear, however, that CAMBIO engaged in or supported educational or advocacy activities that may have contributed to influencing the final language of S. 744.

Three CAMBIO Steering Committee members argued that CAMBIO’s influence was limited because it was not yet fully up and running at time of the Senate CIR consideration. For example:

When the Senate reform bill was to the point of discussion on border enforcement, when it was going through the Judiciary Committee, marking up the border enforcement part of it, the CAMBIO campaign was just not positioned strongly enough to deal with it. I think that there were still some infrastructure needs being built around the lobbyists, around the communications capacity, and certainly around a consensus for where CAMBIO was going to land in case the border enforcement part was out of balance with what we needed . . . And throughout the markup process, through Judiciary, CAMBIO got better . . . ultimately that it was the individual organizations [that] had to do the bulk of the work, [CAMBIO was] disjointed still. [Member]

Two of the other three informants who found the impact of CAMBIO modest stated that, nevertheless, there was some value, even if limited, in the information exchange that occurred during the planning
process. One of these Steering Committee members explained that the delay in full establishment of CAMBIO as an entity with dedicated resources and collective goals meant that, while members were exchanging information during the Senate process and engaging in some joint activities, they were not yet fully acting collectively, and were continuing to preserve their organizations’ individual prerogatives.

If one had more time and an ideal structure, there would have been more coordination in the Senate process or even afterwards, in terms of proposed language, coming to agreement on substantive pitches. Some of it was time pressure and lack of opportunity. At that time, there was some sense that everyone had to maintain their own access and proposals. [Member]

One other CAMBIO Steering Committee member disagreed with the above three members, stating, “[t]he impact we had on the debate was quite substantial in the Senate bill, the things that did not get moved forward, those absolutely can be attributed to CAMBIO.” [Member]

The data seems to support, at the very least, that individual CAMBIO members were actively engaged in advocacy with Congress, the press, and the immigrants’ rights community, and that they had influence on the legislation. One external veteran policy advocate observed, “[w]hen immigration reform was on the Senate floor, I thought enforcement voices were stronger than prior go-arounds.” [External informant]

Section 5: CAMBIO’s Contribution on Border Issues

After S. 744 passed the Senate and immigration reform advocates’ attention shifted to the House of Representatives, the CAMBIO campaign decided to focus its lobbying and communications resources on a more limited set of policy objectives, based on an analysis of the needs, risks, and opportunities of the immigration battle in the House. Border enforcement issues became one of two main focuses of the CAMBIO campaign during this period. Below the report provides a brief summary of CAMBIO’s principal border-related activities and resulting outcomes.

5.1 CAMBIO’s Border-Related Activities

This subsection summarizes activities and strategies undertaken by CAMBIO on border enforcement policy. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list of CAMBIO activities, but rather a comprehensive sample of the activities and strategies that CAMBIO implemented.

CAMBIO played a border liaison role. CAMBIO hired a DC-based border liaison, whose position was initially incorporated into a sub-grant to CAMBIO member BNHR. In September 2013, the position was restructured as CAMBIO campaign staff. The border liaison coordinated the campaign activities of northern and southern border organizations, gathered intelligence on border policy developments in Washington, represented border groups at meetings in DC, facilitated calls and meetings of the border table (described in the following paragraph), and coordinated CAMBIO border advocacy activities on Capitol Hill, such as advocacy days and congressional briefings.

CAMBIO provided a convening space on border issues. CAMBIO convened a national border workgroup, or “table,” facilitated by CAMBIO’s Border Liaison. The table was comprised of both DC-based groups
that work on border issues, and organizations from the border region. According to CAMBIO reports, the table provided not only a venue for information-sharing and coordination of efforts, but also a place for groups to jointly plan, strategize, and promote their organizing and advocacy efforts.

**CAMBIO congressional briefings and meetings on Capitol Hill.** In the second half of 2013, CAMBIO hosted five briefings for members of the House of Representatives, four of which included discussion of border enforcement issues.

- July 15th: CAMBIO conducted an overview of CAMBIO issues for House staffers;
- July 29th: Hattaway Communications presented CAMBIO’s “Winning Words” document to staffers;
- September 26th: Southern border leaders discussed reforms from border communities’ perspectives;
- November 20th: Individuals who lost a loved one due to the actions of US Customs and Border Protection shared their painful stories.

In 2014, CAMBIO participated in a congressional briefing in conjunction with the A4C campaign entitled, “The Truth about Immigration Enforcement,” which sought to counteract claims about the Obama Administration’s unwillingness to enforce federal immigration laws. It also hosted a briefing for the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus on the topic of more humane approaches to border and interior enforcement issues, and to explain the harmful implications of the Corker-Hoeven Amendment.

In addition to the formal briefings discussed above, CAMBIO staff and Steering Committee members conducted many visits with congressional offices, including with legislators who were targeted for their potential to support border priorities. As of the beginning of May 2014, CAMBIO had visited a total of 95 congressional offices, approximately half of which were Republicans. CAMBIO shared the information gathered in these meetings with CAMBIO members, Strategic Partners, and a wide array of CIR allies. Included amongst the meetings were important targets for border-related legislation, such as legislative offices working on a border-enforcement-reform bill introduced by Representatives Steve Pearce (R-NM) and Beto O’Rourke (D-TX). According to CAMBIO staff members, the border groups affiliated with CAMBIO were engaged in efforts to influence a border security bill proposed by Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX), Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, important portions of which were eventually incorporated into H.R. 15, CIR legislation co-sponsored by Democratic House leadership.

CAMBIO staff and consultants also arranged meetings with congressional offices for border community representatives and allies when they traveled to DC to participate in advocacy events and activities. (See discussion below.)

**Advocacy days and other CAMBIO-sponsored actions or events.** CAMBIO supported and engaged in several DC-focused advocacy and educational activities. In 2014, with the objective of attracting media attention to SBCC’s “Revitalize Not Militarize” campaign, border residents created a border quilt, featuring more than 150 panels that told individual community stories of loss due to militarization of the border. CAMBIO hosted an unveiling of the quilt in DC, at which Reps. Grijalva (D-AZ), Hinojosa (D-TX), Sablan (D-Northern Mariana Islands), Sanchez (D-CA), and Vargas (D-CA) attended. In addition,
CAMBIO’s Border Liaison presented on a panel after a Washington screening of the film “Who is Dayani Cristal?” a documentary about deaths of migrants crossing the border.

In 2014, CAMBIO organized a border faith delegation advocacy day, which included media meet-and-greets, and meetings with Republican Members of Congress and with the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. Faith leaders were joined staff from ACLU’s Arizona and New Mexico affiliates and their clients, who to recount their experiences of being harassed and having their rights violated at the hands of Border Patrol officials. In 2014, CAMBIO efforts also supported the introduction of the Pearce-O’Rourke bill, a bipartisan legislative proposal that addresses many of CAMBIO’s border oversight and accountability priorities. In addition to joining a press conference (led by the Border Network for Human Rights) promoting the bill, CAMBIO representatives conducted meetings with the offices of Republican representatives, including Sanford (SC), Diaz-Balart (FL), McMorris Rodgers (WA), and Bachus (AL), to discuss issues of CBP oversight and accountability. While the faith leaders were in Washington conducting visits, CAMBIO placed an op-ed in The Hill from Father Bill Remmel.24

Meetings and briefings of the Obama Administration on border issues. In 2013, CAMBIO, working with the Obama Administration, organized an educational forum on foreign trade and border enforcement oversight and accountability. Attendees included staff from the White House Domestic Policy Council, Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, along with Rep. Grijalva (D-AZ). SBCC brought in over 20 leaders from different southwestern border states, including faith-based, business, activist, and local government representatives, for this summit. Border community members who attended the summit also participated in a lobby day and a briefing on Capitol Hill. After the event, Cecilia Muñoz, the White House Domestic Policy Council (DPC) director, wrote a blog post in which she provided an update on new CBP initiatives, including consideration of a pilot project on body-worn cameras for CBP agents—a CAMBIO policy priority. Subsequently, the White House facilitated a second meeting with DHS, CBP, and the Department of Justice, focusing on border accountability issues.

In addition, the day after President Obama announced that DHS would conduct a review of enforcement priorities, CAMBIO and a small number of member organizations were invited to a White House meeting with the President and Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson. Working with border groups, CAMBIO educated key representatives from the DPC about needed reforms to Border Patrol practices and policies. CAMBIO also met with DHS Deputy Secretary Mayorkas to inform him about Southwest border communities’ perspectives on border enforcement policy, and shared campaign policy recommendations with Secretary Johnson’s office. Also in 2014, a CAMBIO staffer joined other advocates in a meeting with Deputy Attorney General James Cole. At that meeting, the CAMBIO staff member raised at least two CAMBIO border priorities, lapel cameras for border agents and Operation Streamline.

Field activities. By May 2014, CAMBIO had supported over 15 actions and educational events across the country, many of which related to issues of border enforcement. CAMBIO also supported targeted

---

calling of legislators through a sub-grant to the ACLU during the S. 744 negotiation process (as noted above in Section 4.2) on three policy priorities, one of which was “halting the militarization of the border region.”

**Communications and media activities.** CAMBIO communications staff and consultants worked closely with representatives of border groups to help develop messaging, build relationships with Spanish-language and mainstream national media outlets, hold telephonic press briefings, and help shape press statements and interviews with journalists. Prior to their work with CAMBIO, most of the border groups had few resources for media advocacy. Some of the reporters with whom CAMBIO facilitated introductions subsequently went to the border region to research stories.

CAMBIO also developed an infographic illustrating the ineffectiveness of the current border enforcement regime, which was disseminated widely on social media platforms by CAMBIO, campaign member organizations, and other allies; and a hashtag, #BorderOverkill, which was used by close to 50 organizations and individuals. CAMBIO consultants also created the shareable images: “No More Border Deaths” (for Día de Los Muertos), “Border Control is Out of Control,” and “Control the Border Patrol #ReleasePERF,” which were distributed to thousands of social media users. CAMBIO consultants also supported individual member organization efforts, such as supporting BNHR’s announcement of the Pearce-O’Rourke border bill, and created or placed opinion articles about border enforcement in various media sources.

### 5.2 Outcomes of CAMBIO-Related Border Activities

**Elevating the visibility of border issues and border organizations in DC and in the media.** One of CAMBIO’s consultant team explained that congressional representatives who do not represent border districts are unaware of what life is like for border communities that live under current levels of militarization. According to this consultant, CAMBIO did a good job of educating policymakers about the issues and the perspectives of border communities. External observers agreed, closely associating CAMBIO with its border work. The great majority of external observers/Strategic Partners of CAMBIO commended CAMBIO’s contribution toward raising the visibility of border enforcement issues and/or the perspectives of border communities to actors within the Beltway and with the media. 25 One prominent longtime immigration advocate stated,

> One of the problems we have structurally is that border groups are on the border and do not have a presence in DC. And when they try to engage in DC, it is not as effective. CAMBIO was a place where their concerns would reach a sympathetic group, and [which] carried their message in the DC advocacy world. Tough because border issues are least represented in DC. [External informant]

Another prominent Beltway advocate specifically credited CAMBIO with raising the credibility of policy asks relating to lapel and dashboard cameras for oversight of border-enforcement officers.

---

25 Two external informants did not comment on CAMBIO’s border work because they were unfamiliar with the border policy issues or environment. One external informant was generally critical of CAMBIO, and did not think it was very effective.
But let me isolate on one issue, lapel cameras, we are fighting an uphill battle . . . Only CAMBIO, to my knowledge, have pursued it. We have mentioned it, the ACLU has mentioned it, but only as a small part of a larger group of issues. It is now on the table. It was raised in the context of our meeting with the President . . . Whether we achieve the result is anyone’s guess. Unless you have someone putting it out there, I guarantee it would not happen. [External informant]

Almost all of the non-border Steering Committee members of CAMBIO also commented on CAMBIO’s contribution to raising the visibility of border issues. For example, one member that is a longstanding national immigrant rights advocate stated, “[W]hen I think of CAMBIO’s added value, the number one piece, for the first time ever in the history of the CIR fight, that border groups are at the table and integrated into broader immigrant rights groups battles.” [Member]

All four border advocates with whom we spoke agreed that CAMBIO contributed to raising the visibility of border issues and/or border communities within the Beltway. For example, one stated,

Speaking from [informant organization’s] point of view, CAMBIO played a fundamental role in keeping border accountability front and center in the conversation. We’ve been able to push back against disastrous legislative pieces. CAMBIO has opened up important legislative doors and opportunities. It allowed us to move a pro-active agenda administratively. The work we did collectively has helped inform the rest of our movement about the serious problems we face on the southern border. [Member]

Another border advocate commented that CAMBIO helped bridge the gap between the agendas of border- and general immigration reform advocates that has existed in prior iterations of immigration reform.

I think that CAMBIO bridged that gap, or rather made it more narrow. I think that was one of the biggest contributions for CAMBIO. Forcing the immigration advocates [in DC] to deal with border interests in the way they didn’t feel they needed to deal with these interests before. [Member]

One border advocate explained that, historically, border organizations did not have the institutional support needed to ensure their perspectives were heard in immigration reform debates. “Having had this time with CAMBIO has been incredible. The movement and organizations have had much more access to the media and these forums than ever before.” [External informant]

In addition to institutional support provided by CAMBIO’s communications and lobby consultants, the presence of CAMBIO’s DC-based Border Liaison and the support that the Liaison provided to border groups resulted in greater access for border advocates in DC. As one border advocate stated, “CAMBIO increased the presence of the border in DC. We really need someone there daily. We need more of a presence there.” [Member] Among the specific value-added of the Border Liaison position mentioned by informants was enhancing border groups’ access to legislative offices, because the Border Liaison could consistently attend meetings as part of a CAMBIO group covering a range of issues; keeping up with developments on Capitol Hill and timely alerting of border groups of issues to which they would need to
respond quickly (such as drafts of legislative proposals); consistent representation of CAMBIO’s border interests at Hill briefings; and border groups’ having ongoing representation in meetings held with DC-based advocate-allies.

CAMBIO also helped representatives of border groups access policymakers and other decision makers in DC. For example, CAMBIO coordinated a presentation to the new Homeland Security Secretary on the border at which representatives of southern- and northern border organizations presented, including BNHR, ACLU of New Mexico, Border Action Network (a member of SBCC), and the National Network for Arab-American Communities (a member of the Northern Border Coalition).

CAMBIO helped raise the profile and visibility of some of its affiliated border groups on a national level, as well as locally. One border advocate explained that, prior to its involvement with CAMBIO, it had difficulty scheduling meetings with its local Border Patrol sector chief, because, according to this advocate, “they don’t think meeting with us has impact on their reputation.”

CAMBIO has facilitated meetings with high-level officials in Washington. This helps us to get into places. Like now with [the] humanitarian crisis, the government did not want to let us into facilities. We have been held out of the room. This week, here we are with CBP briefing in Washington. I get to go and be part of that. That brings a whole lot of attention to us before the sector chief here. On Monday, he is giving me a tour of the facility where they are holding the unaccompanied children. In the past, that would not have happened . . . In the history of [informant organization], [we] have never had this level of exposure to Secretary Johnson, or been at a White House Summit, or even going to a use of force briefing in Washington. Now that we are, people know we will get quoted, this gives us a whole set of tools. [External informant]

**Better coordination, cooperation, and understanding between border groups and those working on interior enforcement.** One of the strongest findings in our data was the improved integration of border and interior enforcement advocacy. As one Steering Committee member, a long-time advocate, explained, the lasting impact of CAMBIO is that there is a general understanding in the enforcement field that border and interior enforcement policies are part of the same enforcement framework, and thus must be addressed by advocates in an integrated manner. Indeed, several non-border-member organizations have been more active on border issues and/or have been lifting up border messaging in their meetings on Capitol Hill and through their other advocacy activities due to their involvement in CAMBIO. According to Steering Committee members we spoke with, this is due to increased understanding of border issues and the perspectives of border communities. One member stated, “I can speak personally, the border groups, I didn’t know them before at all. And now I really do have a good understanding, I take their advice on things – that’s been a hugely important development.” [Member] Another stated, “[w]e focused on border more than we would have. Because we were working in coalition, and understood the impact.” [Member]

One staffer of a Steering Committee member organization that had worked on border issues in the past stated that participation in CAMBIO led to greater prioritization of border issues within his office, in particular due to the presence of CAMBIO’s border liaison in DC.
CAMBIO provided the only space within DC . . . To be able to work with border groups in this setting was a huge plus. It is interesting, because some of it was happenstance, part of it BNHR had a representative in DC . . . that was important, then we had an interface with a border colleague here that was also projecting and lobbying for a local constituency . . . The direct presence was important. . . . [the] border liaison role for CAMBIO . . . That was important. [Member]

One member informant whose organization was also part of the A4C campaign explained that she was able to uplift border issues within that broader immigration reform coalition due to her work with CAMBIO border groups.

We both had enforcement issues but also bread and butter benefits, we were able to convince our DC partners that they needed to stand with us in opposition to any of those. When it came to border issues, I was the only [one who] could talk about border issues having [participated in] CAMBIO. [Member]

One border advocate who was lukewarm about CAMBIO’s overall impact nevertheless agreed about CAMBIO’s impact on border issues:

Within CAMBIO, I feel also that there was a greater appreciation for border issues, I saw DREAMer groups put out information, [and] NDLON, on border issues, I don’t know if it would have happened if we had not sat next to each other at CAMBIO meetings. [Member]

**CAMBIO’s contribution to S. 744.** As stated above in Section 4.4, while the Corker-Hoeven Amendment was disastrous in terms of CAMBIO’s overall border priorities, CAMBIO’s interventions likely secured some positive border-related provisions, including a requirement that DHS monitor and report data on migrant deaths, and rescue beacons to be placed along the southern border to prevent such deaths.

**CAMBIO helped to develop and coordinate a strategy to ensure the Corker-Hoeven Amendment was not included in House bills.** According to CAMBIO grant reports, after the S. 744 passed the Senate, CAMBIO regrouped and decided to focus much of its House lobbying, communications, and educational activities on border issues.

While we were surprised by Corker-Hoeven, we regrouped. The media and many groups outside of CAMBIO expressed concern about the outrageousness of the border provisions, and helped to lay the groundwork for the subsequent conference work. We have assurances from DPC and some members of the Senate Gang that the Senate will not press to keep [Corker-Hoeven] in the final bill. We are working on the House side, which is skeptical of both the price tag and the wisdom of Corker-Hoeven. [CAMBIO Corporate Documents]

At the same time that S. 744 was being considered in the Senate, the House Homeland Security Committee reported out H.R. 1417, the “Border Security Results Act.” The bill was co-sponsored by Chairman McCaul and the Ranking Member of the Committee, and known as the McCaul-Thompson bill.
According to one border advocate, H.R. 1417 “was trying to infuse more common sense, let’s develop a plan before we throw more [border enforcement] money at them.” [Member]

Much of CAMBIO’s legislative efforts in the summer and early fall of 2013, after the Senate’s approval of S. 744, were aimed at convincing the Democratic leadership in the House to use the bipartisan McCaul-Thompson bill, and not Corker-Hoeven Amendment language, in the comprehensive reform bill (H.R. 15) that Democrats introduced in October 2013. Border groups had concerns about some of the provisions within the McCaul-Thompson bill. Border advocates and CAMBIO did not think, however, that the political environment permitted advocates to significantly negotiate the content of House Democratic leadership’s CIR vehicle. They also felt comfortable taking the position that McCaul’s bipartisan bill was preferable to the Corker-Hoeven Amendment. One CAMBIO staff/consultant stated, “to study the border before resourcing it more, that was a key element that made it more sane and rational. Not saying that they “supported” McCaul, but [that it was] more reasonable to analyze first, resource later.” [Staff/consultant]

CAMBIO advocated with Democrats and Republicans in the House, as well as with the broader immigrants’ rights field. As a result of this work, the House Democratic leadership used the bipartisan McCaul-Thompson border security bill, and not Corker-Hoeven language, in H.R. 15, thereby giving their proposal a more bipartisan character. In fact, the language of Corker-Hoeven did not appear in any House bills.

CAMBIO member BNHR worked with two Members in the House, Representatives Steve Pearce (R-NM) and Beto O’Rourke (D-TX), on a bipartisan border bill that included many of CAMBIO’s border policy priorities. According to one staff member, after the bill was introduced in March 2014, CAMBIO helped BNHR to get greater media coverage, and to make sure that non-border immigrants’ rights groups and non-border Members of Congress were aware of the bill.

**CAMBIO wins on administrative policy reform.** An important reflection of increased political will amongst administration officials was that the White House, working with CAMBIO, hosted the 2013 summit on border issues and foreign trade discussed in Section 5.1. According to CAMBIO staff, that summit, accompanied by a briefing and lobby visits by border leaders, influenced the omnibus budget package: For the first time in several years, the budget did not increase the number of border agents, instead increasing the number of customs agents. The summit was followed by a series of meetings between border groups and representatives of the DPC, DHS, and DOJ. According to CAMBIO staff, these meetings eventually led to the public release of a study conducted on CBP’s use of force by the authoritative and well-respected Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), as well as a series of progressively stronger guidance documents on use of force. One congressional staffer credited CAMBIO efforts with contributing to these positive developments within the administration. “Keeping up the pressure with folks in Senate and House, and administration. Creating a buzz on the issues helps to elevate it and keep on agenda for the administration.” [External informant]

In September 2014, CBP Commissioner Gil Kerlikowske announced reforms to the agency’s policies on handling of complaints of excessive use of force. These included the establishment of an internal affairs
office, which will train investigators to respond to use-of-force allegations, and the formation of an “integrity advisory panel” of outside law enforcement experts to review cases, and advise the agency on how to detect and prevent officer misconduct. Commissioner Kerlikowske also stated that the agency would pilot body-worn cameras this year, but that they would not be put to use in the field until privacy concerns were addressed. While this development occurred after the completion of CAMBIO’s operations, it is likely that CAMBIO contributed to it, given the findings of our research: in particular, the contributions of CAMBIO to raising awareness of border issues, including the pressure CAMBIO put on the administration to release the PERF report.

Section 6: CAMBIO’s Efforts to Counter the SAFE Act

In June 2013, Rep. Rep. Trey Gowdy (R-SC), Chairman of the House Immigration and Border Security Subcommittee, introduced H.R. 2278, the “Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement” (SAFE) Act, with the support of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), and Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX), a veteran restrictionist legislator. The bill was reported out of the House Judiciary Committee on June 18, 2013. Considered a direct descendant of the 2006 Sensenbrenner bill, SAFE, among other things, would permit state and local authorities to enact and enforce their own penalties for immigration violations, require federal authorities to take arrested noncitizens into federal custody within 48 hours of arrest by state or local law enforcement regardless of individual circumstances, and eliminate the executive branch’s authority to grant deferred removal under DACA or similar programs.

6.1 CAMBIO’s SAFE-Related Activities

In the fall of 2013, SAFE became one of two principal targets (the other being border issues) on which CAMBIO Steering Committee members agreed to focus their advocacy. CAMBIO was a leader in opposition to the SAFE Act in the second part of 2013 and in 2014. This subsection summarizes activities undertaken by CAMBIO to counter SAFE.

CAMBIO did individual lobbying, advocacy days, and briefings on SAFE on Capitol Hill. SAFE was considered a contender in the summer and fall of 2013 to be the House vehicle for conferencing with comprehensive immigration legislation passed by the Senate. CAMBIO engaged rigorously in legislative activities, utilizing the SAFE Act as a “hook” for educating Members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, on CAMBIO’s priority issues. A CIR advocate, who, overall, expressed a skeptical opinion of CAMBIO’s accomplishments during our interview, said that CAMBIO played a “leading role” on SAFE Act advocacy, educating staffers through setting up briefings and meetings, “making sure staffers understood the damage that would be done if harmful proposals would be passed.”

27 A quick review of news articles about the CBP policy change do not quote any CAMBIO members or organizations on the border, but rather the articles quote a DC-based organization, the Women’s Refugee Commission. An important question to ask is whether or not CAMBIO and its members would have had a stronger media presence on this story had CAMBIO and its communications infrastructure still been intact when this development occurred.
CAMBIO hosted a briefing in the House of Representatives on September 12, 2013, at which law enforcement officers explained how police involvement in immigration enforcement makes communities less safe. CAMBIO also worked with chiefs of police to urge them to reach out to House leadership to explain their disapproval of the SAFE Act. Experts (such as law enforcement) who were brought in by CAMBIO for briefings also had Hill meetings scheduled for them.

CAMBIO also reached out to other pro-immigration-reform coalitions to secure their opposition to SAFE. One CAMBIO Steering Committee member reported that CAMBIO SAFE Act materials were used on Capitol Hill and with other advocates, and helped shape the response to SAFE from the immigrants’ rights community at large.

**CAMBIO provided to the field materials for traditional and social media engagement, and held field calls.** CAMBIO’s field work on SAFE was not highly intensive due to the limited amount of resources that CAMBIO had available to dedicate to field operations. Some CAMBIO activities on SAFE included a field call hosted in September 2013 about the SAFE Act, a Spanish-language Webinar on SAFE Act provisions to the Southeast Immigrant Rights Network (SEIRN), and assistance with a “day of action” in fall 2013 in Little Rock, Arkansas. CAMBIO also helped SEIRN, New Orleans Worker Center, and the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights to organize a town hall in New Orleans for 75 community members that focused on the impact on African-American communities of criminalization of immigrants, as well as an action directed at a local Member of Congress.

**CAMBIO created messaging and materials on SAFE for traditional media and social media.** QGA was engaged in the early fall in drafting op-eds for SAFE Act opponents in consultation with CAMBIO’s Communications Working Group. SAFE Act memes were developed and delivered through Facebook and Twitter. Fenton Communications, working with CAMBIO’s Communications Working Group, developed several corresponding infographics, including “A Day in the Life under the Safe Act,” to educate the field about the harsh impact that the SAFE Act would have on communities. At the request of field groups, and in conjunction with Immigrant Justice Network, CAMBIO developed a SAFE Act training curriculum on criminalization of immigrants that helped to publicize the bill’s harmful provisions. Telephonic briefings were held for both Spanish language and English language press.

**CAMBIO mobilized Washington advocacy groups to oppose SAFE.** In September 2013, CAMBIO spearheaded a campaign for the immigrants’ rights community to take a “hard line” on SAFE. An express CAMBIO advocacy and communications goal in the fall of 2013 was to integrate SAFE clearly into other organizations’ advocacy positions, including their citizenship messaging. An external informant said, “I think CAMBIO was the only umbrella group focused on the challenges of fixing the SAFE Act.” [External informant]

### 6.2 Outcomes of CAMBIO’s Advocacy on SAFE

CAMBIO’s accomplishments on SAFE are among the strongest outcomes we charted in our review.

**CAMBIO contributed centrally to holding off further legislative activity on the SAFE Act.** CAMBIO contributed importantly to preventing the SAFE Act from being the default House legislation to be
Anita Khashu and Kathleen Sullivan, Consultants
November 2014

Conference with other bills, according to a strong trend in our data. Due at least in part to CAMBIO's work, the SAFE Act became no longer an easy win for House restrictionists. The two congressional staffers we interviewed stated that CAMBIO contributed importantly to SAFE Act opposition:

The campaign around the SAFE Act made Republicans understand that is a “no go” for us. Unlikely that SAFE Act fully will come back to the Floor. If anything comes back it will be more minor, because of the advocacy they have been doing . . . They put infographics, lobbying with House . . . helped create awareness that it was not a bill that was going to be acceptable to community . . . I think bringing along different constituencies, like law enforcement, is super helpful. I can see in my conversations with Republicans in the House, they are very aware of issues like SAFE Act. I question whether they would be as aware if no one was lobbying on the issues . . . For me, as a negotiator, it is useful to have other people saying same stuff on the outside. If I was saying “interior enforcement is important,” and no other groups doing lobbying, it is not very convincing. [External informant]

[CAMBIO did] two big things: (1) public education work, bringing together unlikely voices, raising issues that are harder to discuss, with the right messengers, (2) served as a resource for us . . . to work on the SAFE Act in particular . . . They are one of the reasons, not the only, that the bill has not passed committee [consideration in the House] . . . they helped make the bill toxic . . . how unwelcome certain provisions were to communities and law enforcement. The most important one was getting across how toxic it was to Latinos . . . A lot of their briefings on the Hill gave Members confidence to speak up on [enforcement issues] . . . Some Republicans were even voting for Democratic amendments [in committee consideration of SAFE]. Their work helped to sow some distrust; some Republican Members were wondering why the bill was overreaching. [External informant]

Three external informants with decades of combined Washington advocacy experience also indicated that CAMBIO played a central role in stalling forward movement in the House.

CAMBIO coalition, more than any other constellation of groups, were able to help make the SAFE Act, make Republicans and Democrats understand, that it would be harmful to include the full SAFE Act. At minimum, that they needed to significantly reduce [provisions of SAFE Act] . . . A lot of us were saying the SAFE Act has to be a bottom line, not included . . . CAMBIO sort of coordinated visits with Republican offices sending the same message and with Democrats engaged in the process. [External informant]

One of these advocates said that CAMBIO’s briefing in the House with law enforcement officials “helped change the conversation.” “When [staffers] are responding to a law enforcement officer . . . [t]here may be some more honest dialogue, than if [the conversation were between the] advocate and the office.” [External informant]

CAMBIO staff, consultants, and internal meeting notes reflect CAMBIO’s assessment that the CAMBIO campaign’s “drawing a line in the sand” was effective in holding back the SAFE Act. Participants in our May 20 focus group, and several CAMBIO interviewees, stated that CAMBIO work “made the SAFE Act
“Toxic.” Among the elements of this, according to CAMBIO staff and consultants, were an aggressive number of meetings with Hill staff (particularly Republicans); ensuring many signatories to an advocates’ sign-on letter opposing SAFE (described in the following subsection), and the fact that highly influential organizations were included in the letter; the briefing by police chiefs and op-eds by these influencers, which, among other things, gave “cover” to some Democrats in the House to speak out; and engaging BBB (Bibles, Badges, and Business) groups and religious organizations in opposition.

Six CAMBIO Steering Committee members agreed that CAMBIO had an outsized impact on the SAFE Act because of members’ collective advocacy action on Capitol Hill. One member contended that the access that CAMBIO had was due to its work with the Republican lobbyist, and due to talking points designed by the lobbying firm that resonated with Republicans. One member observed that some Republican offices, when visited, said that they had heard of SAFE, and had a negative reaction to it. The campaign also educated Democrats, such as pro-worker Members concerned about immigration raids and racial profiling who might not otherwise have considered themselves pro-immigrant.

One CAMBIO staff member and two CAMBIO members, however, expressed criticism of CAMBIO’s reaction to SAFE. The staff member stated that CAMBIO spent far too long discussing and negotiating the sign-on letter from advocates to the House leadership. (See Section 10.6 relating to CAMBIO’s difficulty in making decisions on certain difficult topics.) The CAMBIO member was disappointed that CAMBIO staff did not side with some CAMBIO members in coming out publicly against all SAFE-Act-type provisions (as opposed to solely opposing the SAFE Act itself). A second CAMBIO member said that CAMBIO advocacy on SAFE did not adequately concentrate on issues that CAMBIO’s contract lobbyists felt were more difficult to talk about – such as the criminal-immigration issues.

**Washington advocacy organizations opposed SAFE more vigorously because of CAMBIO.** At the urging of several CAMBIO members, including NDLON and UWDN, CAMBIO drafted and recruited signatories to a letter to the leadership of the House of Representatives, demanding that no feature of the SAFE Act be included in any immigration reform legislation. The letter ultimately was signed by 95 immigrants’ rights, civil rights, and labor organizations, exceeding CAMBIO’s initial signatory goal by almost 50 percent. Signatories included some of the nation’s most prominent membership organizations, such as the AFL-CIO and NAACP. UWDN was credited by CAMBIO staff with securing the signature of National Council of La Raza, one of the nation’s most influential civil rights groups.

Two external informants from different sections of the Washington advocacy community stated that CAMBIO created a united front within the Washington advocacy community on SAFE: “I think it has been very good, a lot of it came in the context of the SAFE Act, making sure we weren’t sacrificing one group for another group.” [External informant] “They focused on enforcement issues; they worked with Republican offices, got Republican intelligence. I think that was all helpful in making sure there was a front on enforcement issues.” [External informant] A third external informant said that CAMBIO’s work helped to prepare advocates (in this case, those from faith-based groups) to speak on SAFE more effectively to legislative offices in language that resonates with staffers: “And even religious groups . . . have been better resourced than they were before in taking about it. They’re bringing it up more
effectively . . . before it was [solely] human rights violations, now they can point to reports and statistics and use of force policy.” [External informant]

CAMBIO internal documents, and interviews with CAMBIO staff, consultants, and members, reflect CAMBIO’s opinion that the CAMBIO campaign was an important factor in the decision by some other immigration reform advocates to work against inclusion of SAFE in enacted legislation. For example, participants in our May 20 focus group, and several CAMBIO Steering Committee member informants in our individual interviews with them, stated that CAMBIO influenced the A4C campaign to oppose SAFE. One member opined that the existence of another coalition that could “call out” the A4C membership for acquiescence to SAFE was a factor in A4C’s decision. At the focus group, CAMBIO members also stated that CAMBIO advocacy on SAFE resulted in A4C opening more spaces within its activities for CAMBIO groups to discuss enforcement issues.

As a related matter, a CAMBIO staff member stated that CAMBIO’s goal to integrate SAFE into some other groups’ citizenship messaging was successful: For example, according to this informant, in the course of America’s Voice’s work with CAMBIO, AV incorporated SAFE messaging into the work it did with pro-legalization advocates in the field; an important innovation over previous legislative campaigns, when placards held by legalization advocates at rallies only communicated pro-legalization messages. CAMBIO meeting notes reflected that America’s Voice encouraged a hard line on SAFE, and contributed to the sign-on letter process.28

CAMBIO generated media interest in SAFE. In June 2013, the Chief of Police of Riverside, CA, and the Sheriff of Lake County, IL, participated in a CAMBIO-sponsored press briefing about the negative impact that the SAFE Act would have on community policing. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) read portions of their transcribed statements into the record during the June 18 House Judiciary Committee mark-up of the SAFE Act. One external informant stated that CAMBIO’s work was important to the media’s interest in SAFE – that without CAMBIO’s work, media on the issue would have been less. [External informant]

Observations on CAMBIO’s SAFE Act advocacy. A robust body of informant opinion – including by informants otherwise neutral toward or critical of CAMBIO -- agreed that CAMBIO’s concentrated efforts contributed importantly to holding off wholesale enactment of SAFE Act, by, among other things, securing the signatures of many leading reform activists on a strong letter of opposition to the House leadership. This is an impressive accomplishment for a new campaign structure. We would caution, however, that many other elements were in play on the SAFE Act, and it is particularly difficult to gauge these dynamics at a distance, and long after the fact. As a legislative staffer who praised CAMBIO highly put it, “[t]hat bill was such an overreach, I am not sure it really had a chance. Republicans don’t understand the community and its concerns very well at all. Left to their own devices, they would screw up repeatedly.” [External informant] Moreover, both legislative staffers we interviewed cautioned that the elements of SAFE are not necessarily gone for good, although CAMBIO may have helped to cut back the number of SAFE provisions that are included in future immigration

28 Please note that we did not undertake an independent review of messaging by America’s Voice.
reform proposals. CAMBIO documents and staff interviews reflect CAMBIO members’ and staffers’ appreciation that elements of SAFE would continue to be in play in future legislative sessions (for example, through appropriations legislation in 2014).

Section 7: Additional Findings on CAMBIO’s General Impact

In addition to specific CAMBIO advocacy contributions on more humane border policy, the SAFE Act, and, to a limited extent, the immigration reform bill that passed the Senate, informants provided generalized feedback about CAMBIO’s contribution to the enforcement-reform field. A large segment of the informant pool felt that CAMBIO filled an important niche in the field -- providing a place where groups focused on enforcement issues could come together to share information, coordinate efforts, and jointly strategize. While there were definitely concerns about the initial period of CAMBIO launch (see Section 10.3), generally speaking, informants felt that the coming together of the member groups in one collective voice raised Steering Committee members’ level of access and influence in DC; improved coordination, collaboration, and mutual understanding amongst enforcement-focused organizations; and somewhat improved the media’s coverage of CAMBIO policy priorities.

7.1 Collective Voice Improves Members’ Access and Influence in DC

During our in-person focus group in May 2014, one of the most consistent points of feedback we received from Steering Committee members was that CAMBIO members’ access and influence was strengthened through its collective voice. Our interviews confirmed this finding, with many informants commenting on this perceived benefit of the formation of CAMBIO. One prominent external observer stated,

They were filling a lane that needed to be filled . . . The movement has grown up over the last number of years, some of the issues left to individualized expertise in certain organizations that wasn’t necessarily the strongest way to present our voice on issues. You would have AILA or ACLU focused on a particular enforcement issue, or the border groups [that] didn’t have as strong a voice in DC. There was more of a patchwork of advocates on specific issues, things that changed about the movement, how much solidarity there was over legalization, how broad or unified that push was -- there wasn’t the same type with -- people are traumatized by enforcement, saying “enough” for a long time. But not the same type of coalescing around a demand for enforcement as there was for legalization. There needed to be a coalition, a group that was trying to bring those voices together in a more direct and concerted way. [External informant]

Several members explained how the individual organizations’ access and influence in DC was much greater than in the past iterations of comprehensive immigration reform legislative activity. “For us, the fact that we have been locked out of any ‘table’ seven years ago, then we were brought in a very substantial way, and then having our own table, was a huge shift.” [Member]

When asked about the accomplishments of CAMBIO, one outside consultant with significant campaign experience stated that this was perhaps the most important gain of the campaign.
Just the coalition – the existence of the coalition itself in bringing groups together – important in this atmosphere – strength in numbers, many voices together makes the difference in breaking through. Coalition on enforcement and border is a real positive outcome for the movement and for its impact on the debate. [Staff/consultant]

A seasoned Beltway advocate added that the issues were pursued with greater vigor than the past due to the groups coming together in one campaign with shared resources. [External informant] Indeed, through collaboration and sharing of resources, knowledge, and relationships, CAMBIO effectively expanded the reach of members’ advocacy. CAMBIO members met with 95 congressional offices by May of 2014. They included intensive work with pro-immigrant allies in the House, such as the offices of Minority Leader Pelosi (CA) and Democratic Representatives Becerra (CA), Gutierrez (IL) and Hoyer (MD), all members of House leadership who are anticipated to play leadership roles in future immigration reform campaigns. CAMBIO was described by a consultant as undertaking a “very aggressive” campaign with a core group of Republicans who were trying to put together an immigration reform bill. CAMBIO reported establishing a good working relationship with Rep. Diaz Balart’s (R-FL) office, which emerged as a driver of efforts to secure immigration reform in the first half of 2014. In all, 43 meetings were held with the staff of House Republicans, including the offices of Reps. Cantor (VA), McCaul (TX), and Ryan (WI), who are anticipated to be important Members in the discussion on immigration reform. CAMBIO’s member organizations were actively involved in these meetings, and the information that was gained from these meetings was shared during CAMBIO’s strategy meetings that involved a wide array of CIR allies.

7.2 Strengthened Coordination and Collaboration of Enforcement-Focused Organizations

CAMBIO strengthened relationships between member groups. A large portion of the informants to our research commented on the improved relationships, understanding, and information sharing between CAMBIO-affiliated organizations. Some Steering Committee member groups had worked together in the past, but even those relationships seem to have been strengthened due to organizations’ work on the CAMBIO campaign, and the impact of these strengthened relationships are likely to carry over into their future efforts. One member stated, “[t]he structure of regular meetings, and the idea that we are all in it together. Having CAMBIO something that we are on Steering Committee, regular contact, definitely deepened the bonds.” [Member]

The coming together in one campaign also helped to streamline enforcement asks according to one Steering Committee member and one external informant, although reportedly there still remained challenges to collective prioritization. (See Section 10.1.) One affiliated informant explained in response to a question about whether the informant believed that CAMBIO helped create greater alignment amongst enforcement organizations,

Yes, I do. That’s a really large challenge – they have not fulfilled that mandate – but helpful to it. Different people will say that different parts of enforcement regime are more harmful than others – even among the CAMBIO membership . . . There will be diversity of opinion. They have
Anita Khashu and Kathleen Sullivan, Consultants
November 2014

done a good job of coalescing around priorities and giving language around that. [External informant]

One legislative staffer explained how having a streamlined resource and contact on enforcement issues—such as CAMBIO—is particularly important in a fast-paced legislative debate as in 2013. [External informant] But a House staffer, on a slightly contrary note, stated that he did not observe much of a difference in coordination or alignment of enforcement organizations during this last round of intensive immigration-reform activity.

I don’t know if I have noticed that [greater alignment amongst enforcement organizations]. I think every single group that is member of CAMBIO has done their own letters on SAFE Act. You will probably hear something different in the Senate where there was more happening. [External informant]

One Steering Committee member and one external informant disagreed with the assessment that CAMBIO improved collaboration and coordination within the enforcement field. The member stated,

Initially, it was important for us to maximize our power and efficiency, those groups that were interested in fighting against enforcement tradeoffs. It was important for us to coalesce. I think what changed over time – I actually don’t think that CAMBIO ever lived up to – there were many moving parts, the legislation didn’t come to pass. Even the Senate bill, it was difficult for CAMBIO to move nimbly in reaction to the enforcement issues. We never had a moment when we were greater than the sum of the parts. That was my overall sense. The inclination was right. [Member]

The external informant, who is a very experienced Beltway advocate, argued that enforcement organizations were already working collaboratively on enforcement issues prior to the formation of CAMBIO, and thus that the partnership outcomes are somewhat overblown. But another external informant, who also is a longstanding immigrants’ rights advocate, agreed that many of the organizations would have attempted to collaborate had CAMBIO never existed, but that the reach or intensity would not have been as profound.

The groups were there, AILA, ACLU, NILC --- they would have still done work along those lines. But they would not have had the reach, or organization, or coherence. They would not have been as strategic if they had not already been meeting together as CAMBIO. I think they needed to meet together. Because groups that are trying to do similar things need to talk to each other. It would have been more ad hoc if not for CAMBIO. You need to establish relationships, understand where groups are coming from . . . groups will always work on stuff when there is a crisis, but CAMBIO provides a baseline to do that with. [External informant]

**CAMBIO led to greater understanding and information sharing between member groups.** We also gathered considerable evidence that Steering Committee members experienced cross-fertilization of knowledge and understanding of one another’s substantive issues due to participation in CAMBIO. Having the diversity of expertise within the CAMBIO membership permitted members to nuance their
messages about issues on which they themselves don’t have substantive expertise. (One informant mentioned, for example, that her organization’s press release on Corker-Hoeven benefitted from the expertise of border groups.) A couple of members also reported feeling better prepared to respond to questions or address issues during meetings on Capitol Hill or with the Administration due to their improved understanding of the policy priorities of colleague organizations.

Moreover, several informants discussed how their enhanced understanding of colleague organizations’ issues made them less comfortable with “trading off” other members’ policy priorities, or getting in the way of one another’s strategies. (See Section 10.1.)

They’ve learned about each other’s issues. Can’t underestimate the value of knowing the others’ issues. You’re less likely to sell out if you have information about partners’ work. There are other groups that would be hard-pressed to throw crim-imm people under bus now. It’s hard to measure, [but] I think it’s real. [Staff/consultant]

7.3 Media Visibility

The data we received on overall impact of CAMBIO communications and media advocacy was limited, but this is not surprising given that CAMBIO struggled initially to find the appropriate communications consultants and to define the communications role or objectives of the campaign. However, several members and affiliates discussed the value to their organizations of having access to communications professionals (both from CAMBIO staff and from contracted firms). (See Section 9.4 for findings on CAMBIO’s media and communications activities.) One informant affiliated with CAMBIO, who works for a small organization with little in-house communications capacity, stated,

Being able to take basic concepts and quotes and turning into a bigger press conference. Connecting us to the media. Guidance on messaging and being able to create a uniformity of response. As time went on, we were getting better and better prepared at addressing the media. CAMBIO helped to frame what we do to the larger public. [External informant]

A handful of members and a few external informants reported some improvements in media visibility of CAMBIO policy priorities, in particular those that are particularly difficult to message, like criminal-immigration issues.

I think it was quite successful. With IJN’s role, we have had our part in elevating certain immigrants with crimes in detention and deportation context. With IJN producing compelling stories, CAMBIO was helpful with that. [Member]

Several informants believed that CAMBIO contributed to improving media coverage of CAMBIO’s two policy priorities in the House: border and the SAFE Act. Participants of the in-person focus group in May 2014, for example, mentioned the New York Times’ coverage of life on the border as evidence of the

---

29 Staff interviews also reflect CAMBIO’s recognition that improving Steering Committee organizations’ knowledge of one another’s work was valuable in increasing the understanding of members’ issues among colleague immigrants’ rights organizations.
growth in media attention to border enforcement issues. Informants also credited CAMBIO with getting important stories and editorials placed in prominent national media sources, such as a story about a deported veteran that led to CAMBIO developing some unlikely allies on Capitol Hill. One external informant praised CAMBIO’s social media efforts.

Yeah, I think that they have contributed a lot to raising specifically visibility of border issues, and then the visibility of the impact of harsh immigration enforcement across the country. My personal opinion is that their social media was very effective in bringing up this issue to a wide range of people in a way that I hadn’t see before at least not in a long time, so I do think that they were effective by raising the issue kind of in a broader sense. [External informant]

A media report prepared by CAMBIO consulting firm, Fenton Communications, stated that Fenton created twelve shareable images for distribution through social networking sites and it helped promote CAMBIO member SBCC’s #ReleasePerf image. In total, 99,898 people potentially saw the posts, 313 people liked CAMBIO’s Facebook page, and 4,330 people engaged with CAMBIO’s page. CAMBIO had a total of 810 Twitter followers.

One external informant expressed disagreement with the comments that CAMBIO had an impact on the media’s coverage of enforcement issues, but she also acknowledged that CAMBIO’s policy priorities are amongst the most difficult to message and penetrate the media.

They are the toughest issues, certainly on the comms front. To get traction on issues that were in the weeds, due process, people don’t understand them; reporters don’t want to cover them. . . There’s a real need, I appreciate that filling it is really hard. I feel like there are a handful of, some op-eds that were really helpful and strategic, and I think there was work on the Hill, with allied offices. But to be totally honest, they didn’t break through very much on the broader media narrative on enforcement. [External informant]

One member informant felt the media impact was limited because CAMBIO members had difficulty building consensus and prioritizing policy issues. As a result, according to this internal informant, some of the messages contradicted one another. [Member] (See Section 10.1.)

For more detailed feedback on the impact of CAMBIO’s media and communications activities, see Section 9: Value to Members, Strategic Partners, and Allies.

Section 8: Influence of CAMBIO on the Broader Immigration Reform Campaign

In the most recent iteration of comprehensive immigration reform there were multiple independently run and funded campaigns, including Alliance for Citizenship or “A4C”; Bibles, Badges, and Businesses (BBB); We Belong Together Campaign; the Interfaith Immigration Coalition; Partnership for a New

---

30 A4C is described at http://web.cof.org/2013Annual/docs/AllianceforCitizenship.pdf.
32 See http://www.webelongtogether.org/.

---
Economy; and Forward US. Unique among these, CAMBIO was established to address reform of the immigration-enforcement system.

In engaging in this strategic review process, CAMBIO funders sought a better understanding of the impact of their decision to fund a separate enforcement-reform campaign on some of their other investments in CIR. In addition, CAMBIO campaign staff and Steering Committee members were interested in measuring the impact of CAMBIO’s work on the broader immigration field. We thus included two research questions to gather data on the impact of CAMBIO’s work on other immigration reform campaigns and organizations.

Did an enforcement-oriented campaign mechanism result in “mainstream” immigration campaigns and organizations relating differently to enforcement issues than they had in the past?

Have there been any unanticipated consequences – positive or negative – of forming the coalition and investing in enforcement rather than in the main CIR campaign?

Despite the fact that multiple immigration-reform campaigns were active during the period of CAMBIO’s existence, for the most part, when informants provided information relating to these research questions, they referred to the A4C campaign. Where comments were specifically addressed at other campaigns, we make clear below.

Almost all informants who spoke of CAMBIO’s impact on “mainstream” immigrants’ rights campaigns reported that CAMBIO activities had some influence, albeit limited, on the broader immigrant rights movement. Mostly, informants did not think there were any negative consequences on the broader movement resulting from the formation of a separate campaign specifically on the enforcement provisions of CIR. In addition, there was a considerable degree of consensus amongst informants that there was value-added to the overall movement to have a separate legislative campaign focused on the enforcement.

8.1 CAMBIO’s Influence on “Mainstream” Immigration Campaigns and Organizations

CAMBIO made it more difficult for A4C to ignore enforcement issues. At the May 20th focus group session, Steering Committee members stated that the voices on enforcement were amplified through collective action, which in turn created more space within the broader immigration reform movement for enforcement issues. Six telephonic interviewees underscored the focus group finding, stating that CAMBIO compelled A4C to pay greater attention to enforcement issues.

Our accomplishment was to speak of enforcement questions in a way that was well accepted by folks that in the past ignored it. Our ability to translate many years of demands and protests at

http://www.interfaithimmigration.org/. In terms of faith-based organizations, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops also mounted a campaign described at http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org/index.shtml.

This coalition is described at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/.

The Web site of this campaign, also known as “fwd.us,” is http://www.fwd.us/.
the grassroots level, and frustrations of a decade-long struggle, raising awareness and not being able to penetrate in the mainstream. CAMBIO was able to crack that. It was difficult and very challenging, cracking the hole of CIR establishment, allowing for enforcement questions to sneak in there, was a tremendous accomplishment. That’s the piece that needs to be celebrated in spite of difficulties. That could not have happened without a concentrated strategy. [Member]

One CAMBIO staff member attributed this shift to the high level of sophistication of the campaign, as compared to past efforts, as well as the participation of faith-based groups and law enforcement. Another staff member explained that A4C had one message, a vote for citizenship, and initially had no interest in speaking about enforcement issues. The work that CAMBIO did, however, according to this informant, “helped A4C say – ‘we want citizenship without increased enforcement.’” [Member]

When the field was acclaiming the passage of S. 744, CAMBIO kept focus on the bill’s problematic border provisions. One external informant stated that when the field was celebrating the passage of S. 744 and advocates’ concentration was moving to the House, CAMBIO focused attention on the problematic provisions within the bill, in particular the border provisions. (See Section 5.2.)

Another external informant, who is a member of A4C, credited CAMBIO and its member organizations’ post-S. 744 advocacy efforts around border enforcement provisions with having a profound effect on her organization and its prioritization of border issues.

CAMBIO secured influential mainstream immigrants’ rights groups as signatories on a letter denouncing the SAFE Act. CAMBIO spearheaded an opposition letter on the SAFE Act that 96 organizations signed onto. (See Section 6.2.) Not only did key members of A4C sign onto the letter, but CAMBIO’s campaign activities on the SAFE Act educated and helped persuade faith-based groups, and others organizations that are a part of the BBB campaign, that provisions in SAFE Act were not in their interest, according to two staff members.

The letter was one of the tools, but we also reached out to BBB . . . who communicated to the business groups that it was a poison pill. We educated the faith-based groups and they also pushed hard because of the provisions that would make religious groups who helped undocumented guilty of aiding and abetting. Initially, A4C didn’t understand how bad it was, so education was important. The briefings that CAMBIO helped to support member groups to do that brought in law enforcement to say they didn’t like aspects of it (and also op-eds and letters from them) were also influential in having it not be just the “crazy left voices from California.” [Staff/consultant]

CAMBIO helped at least one organization prioritize enforcement issues. One external informant who works for a very influential organization in the immigration-policy world stated that CAMBIO significantly influenced his organization’s prioritization of enforcement issues.

They helped me to prioritize the enforcement issues within [informant organization]. They gave me, the meetings I did go to and people I talked to, it helped me narrow the issues, we signed onto letters. They work on a whole range of issues, I understand the substantive impact of
enforcement issues, but strategically, it was good to be able to hear from others, what is their focus. So that I know what to focus on internally within [informant organization]. That turns into what are the things that [informant organization] lists as its priorities. [External informant]

**CAMBIO influenced the broader immigration reform movement through production of enforcement-related resources.** A couple of CAMBIO members commented that CAMBIO helped to mainstream some enforcement issues through production and dissemination of communications and lobbying materials.

And mainstreamed just with – working with labor and DV groups . . . we were more than subject-matter experts; we had stuff they could use, pictures and statements. CAMBIO helped us do that – so, for example, AFL-CIO [stories that they used for their “deportation day,” that] was from a CAMBIO postcard. [External informant]

These resources and information were shared with allies across the immigrants’ rights movement, within the administration, and on Capitol Hill. As another CAMBIO Steering Committee member explained, these resources meant that CAMBIO members could be more useful to legislative offices than in prior iterations of immigration reform, which elevated the campaign’s credibility.

One external informant who works for a prominent national organization agreed that CAMBIO has served as the go-to campaign for resources on enforcement issues for the field.

We have weekly comms calls with staff around country. [CAMBIO] would often lead sections of those calls, to talk on interior enforcement or border. Or [the 2014 America’s Voice] communications convening . . . when there was a need for the messaging . . . there were a few times media requests for certain things, more enforcement-related, that weren’t in the wheelhouse [of A4C], we referred them to CAMBIO. They began to operate as the go-to place for messaging and resources on these issues. [External informant]

**CAMBIO’s influence on the language or messages used by “mainstream” immigration organizations.** Several Steering Committee members observed subtle shifts away from use of language that divided immigrants into “good” or “bad” immigrants within the broader immigration reform movement. One of these members whose work focuses on criminal-immigration issues explained,

I did notice a difference in the comms work, because there were a few instances where some of our, even partners, were using the word “not criminals,” “we’re not criminals.” CAMBIO responded asking them to back down on this, and we did, as well. There was a really intentional effort to be more mindful of the language that they were using. It gave them more of a sense of accountability. [Member]

A couple of informants and CAMBIO grant reports also reported specific instances of prominent immigration-reform leaders incorporating CAMBIO messaging in their work. A CAMBIO grant report noted that Eliseo Medina of SEIU, who played a leading role during the Fast for Families action at the
end of 2013,\textsuperscript{36} incorporated border issues into his messaging and press statements regarding immigration reform.

Several internal sources suggested that funder pressure or incentivizing influenced America’s Voice, a prominent communications organization and principal member of A4C, to get on board with anti-enforcement advocacy, as did the fact that AV is very alert to trending press interest, which SAFE provided for a certain period. (As an example, one staff member noted that Frank Sharry of America’s Voice integrated anti-SAFE Act messages in his talking points in late 2013.)

**CAMBIO lacked a clear strategy for influencing mainstream organizations.** One Steering Committee member reported that, while CAMBIO had some influence on the broader immigration reform movement, he thought the impact was minimal. He attributed this to the lack of a clear strategy for accomplishing this objective, and to complications created by the dual participation of several Steering Committee members in A4C and CAMBIO.

I think it did have an effect. They became aware of CAMBIO, and put CAMBIO on panels. At the end, we were unsure of how to interact with mainstream . . . there was probably influence, but we lacked clarity of a plan of how to go to that, and how to measure if it was working. I don’t think there was a clear strategy to do that. It was complicated by the fact that some of the organizations were in A4C. There were some relationship issues to the larger coalition that could have more clearly been dealt with in beginning and revisited periodically. [Member]

**Two external informants questioned the impact of CAMBIO on “mainstream” immigration reform organizations.** When asked whether CAMBIO had an influence on mainstream immigrants’ rights organizations, one of these external informants argued that the distinction between CAMBIO and “mainstream” organizations was false, although she stated that CAMBIO may have ultimately came out further to the “left” than some of the largest immigrants’ rights organizations. One funder informant wondered whether CAMBIO’s choice to focus on “mainstreaming” enforcement issues versus serving as the movement’s left flank limited the impact it had on A4C.

**More information about the value of specific CAMBIO resources and services to the broader immigration reform movement is included in Section 9: Value to Members, Strategic Partners, and Allies.**

**8.2 Unanticipated Negative Consequences of Forming an Enforcement Campaign\textsuperscript{37}**

Given the history of tension between enforcement and more “mainstream” advocates in the past decade of immigration reform activity, we expected some informants to report unintended negative consequences on the broader movement for legalization. As one Beltway advocate explained: “[T]here’s always concern that you might end up splintering . . . if a group is focused exclusively on one thing, and makes it a litmus test – especially if it is a critical mass of groups.” [External informant] However, the only negative comment that we received from external informants was from one funder who

\textsuperscript{36} This action is described at http://fast4families.org/.

\textsuperscript{37} We did not receive any data on unintended positive consequences.
questioned whether the formation of CAMBIO relieved the A4C coalition from having to develop a robust position on enforcement.

One longstanding national advocate attributed the lack of negative consequences to CAMBIO’s ability to strike a balance between zealous advocacy on its policy priorities, and effective relationship-building with the broader immigrants’ rights field.

One thing I think they did well is that they . . . maintained a delicate balance between sticking to your guns on one issue on immigration reform, versus trying to work together with everyone else. You want to keep the enforcement issues alive in the broader coalition, but, at the same time, you want to maintain credibility within broader coalition. I never felt the split. That is on the positive side. [External informant]

Where there was debate, however, is whether or not the formation of CAMBIO had any negative unintended consequences on the immigration enforcement field, as opposed to the larger mainstream immigrants’ rights movement. Several informants reported the perception amongst a few CAMBIO members that the formation and funding of CAMBIO diverted desperately needed funding from CAMBIO member organizations. As described in more detail below in Section 10.2, our interviews with funders and other informants led us to conclude this was not true: If CAMBIO had not been funded, its foundation funders most likely would have allocated those resources to one of the other legislative campaigns that were active during this period of intensive CIR activity.

This perception of “trade-off,” however, combined with the shuttering during the same period of Rights Working Group due to financial difficulties, caused lingering tension and dissent amongst the CAMBIO member groups. This most likely limited the potential impact of the campaign, as a good portion of CAMBIO staff time and Steering Committee meetings was focused on managing inter-group tensions related to, among things, the perceived funding competition. One CAMBIO staff member lamented this tension:

Unintended consequences--the fracturing of enforcement groups. Funding and money and people’s perception, feeling that somehow this was just a place that was taking money away from groups. Before [CAMBIO got funded], everyone was equally screwed. I think the hard part, as much as the resourcing helped to focus on the issues . . . it was challenging, as the prospects [for legislative change] started falling apart, people’s view on what was useful and not useful, it became a lot more contentious. [Staff/consultant]

8.3 Value-Added of Forming a Campaign Focused on Enforcement Provisions of CIR

Our data-gathering also produced little debate on the question of whether or not CAMBIO filled an important need, and whether it was necessary to form a campaign to supplement the work of individual organizations that are focused on enforcement issues. Almost all external informants we interviewed stated that, on balance, there were benefits to the immigrants’ rights movement of forming a specific campaign on immigration enforcement.
And so I think that having that strong national coalition, if we can call it that – because it was conceived of as a campaign – was really important. And it has really lifted up – you have the threshold . . . over the years because of some of the work that some groups have done individually and in this collective effort, kind of holding the movement accountable to not ignoring the impact of policies on communities we’re supposed to be serving . . . I think it’s become a lot less acceptable in the immigrants’ rights movement to blindly accept any kind of proposal that is presented. [External informant]

When CAMBIO members were asked whether or not they would participate in an enforcement campaign if there was another round of intensive campaign work, almost all stated they would participate. 38

I would say yes, the mere existence of CAMBIO . . . it means A4C has to contend with a whole other table, they [CAMBIO] have been effective, folks have been surprised at how effective to build a brand so quickly. The strategic work that has been done by the border groups. That’s a positive, intended or unintended. [Member]

Another member argued that, in the future, if responsibility for carrying enforcement issues reverted back to a larger legalization campaign, enforcement issues would again be traded off in exchange for legalization.

If anything this campaign shows an incredible importance to focus attention on these issues through a separate campaign. We relied on A4C to carry water in the past, and it was a giveaway. We had far more success this time, because we had resources to leverage. And we had our own lobbyist and comms research and strategy, and that made a big difference in how the mainstream groups responded, strategies about how to persuade these groups to think our way. If we reverted back to A4C, enforcement would be traded off. It was still traded off. But we made huge strides because we were willing to fight back at different level. [Member]

Even several informants that were skeptical or critical of CAMBIO and how the campaign was executed agreed that, in principle, there is value to establishing a parallel campaign focused solely on enforcement issues. One of these informants, a Strategic Partner of CAMBIO, explained that the focus on enforcement provided greater depth on the issues.

The benefit is you have a little more depth on a certain issue. So you have things like the infographics, polling, Republican lobbyist to advise on something. Ideally, you will have a pool of information at your fingertips that did not exist before. I am having trouble thinking of a downside. In the world of advocacy, information is your currency. If you could provide more information why something should happen, you are more persuasive. [External informant]

38 Two external informants and four members did not directly respond to this question.
Merely two informants (one external and one internal) argued that a campaign on enforcement was not needed or did not add value, beyond perhaps providing some convening benefits. The external informant stated,

I didn’t not have a great experience working with the coalition. I didn’t feel there was a lot that they were adding value, or that what we were doing was useful. It feels like a coalition that was created by the funders, I feel that, I don’t feel that the need that this being the answer came from. [External informant]

However, this same informant also stated that CAMBIO served as a useful resource for the field on enforcement issues, and remarked that other campaigns did not have similar resources.

One Steering Committee member argued that, instead of building up a campaign infrastructure, the informant’s organization would be interested in participating in more of a convening/information-sharing initiative of the type that the informants’ organization had participated in the past.

The idea, a model where similar, like-minded, organizations agreed to meet three or four times a year, people laid on the table their priorities and resources to see if bumping or tension or synergies, we’d be in favor of . . . Regular set check-in session with natural allies. Creating an entity that fosters resource competition does not make sense. Our proposal would be to have in a sense a federation of like-minded organizations that met and in structured way. [Member]

Section 9: Value to Members, Strategic Partners, and Allies

In analyzing data on CAMBIO’s value to Steering Committee members, we note that CAMBIO, while principally a campaign, also was a coalition of advocacy organizations. These organizations have independent advocacy lives and strategic relationships outside of a campaign. Thus, CAMBIO operated in a marketplace where its plusses (or “value proposition”) generally needed to outweigh its minuses. As a leading expert on advocacy coalitions observes:

Coalitions must be able to clearly articulate why they are the right vehicle for current or potential members that might otherwise join another group or remain unaffiliated . . . coalitions must demonstrate their “value add” . . . in terms of why a coalition is the optimal strategy to meet an organization’s goals . . . In general, a coalition needs to have a vision demonstrating how its benefits outweigh its costs, and leadership should foster a belief in the ability of the coalition to achieve its goals.

---

39 Two recent reports by leading advocacy evaluators that analyze elements of success in coalitional advocacy—an evaluation of a successful legislative coalition for health care reform, and a more general analysis of effective advocacy coalitions—inform this section and Section 10 of this report. The first report is Grassroots Solutions and M & R Strategic Services, HCAN Evaluation: Executive Summary, An Overview of the Comprehensive Qualitative Evaluation of the Health Care for America Now Campaign (Sept. 2010) (cited as “HCAN Report”). The second is Jared Raynor, TCC Group, What Makes an Effective Coalition? Evidence-Based Indicators for Success (March 2011) (cited as “Raynor”).

40 A true marketplace of ideas and strategies only exists, of course, if funders of CAMBIO organizations would continue to support them even if they departed the campaign structure. See Section 10.9.

41 Raynor at 18.
Among the potential benefits of coalition membership are networking, information sharing, access to resources, shared mission, ability to attain desired outcomes, enhanced visibility/“power in numbers,” and ability to build skills. Among the potential costs of coalition membership are time, loss of autonomy, compromise, expending scarce resources, and “middle-ground tendency.” As described in this section, we identified most of these plusses and many of these minuses, although even CAMBIO’s more strident critics among the Steering Committee found at least some value in CAMBIO. While other components were mentioned in our interviews, the principal sources of value identified by Steering Committee members were CAMBIO staff (including the border liaison), convening resources, CAMBIO’s government relations/lobbying consultant, communications assistance, and legislative services.

9.1 CAMBIO Staff

Steering Committee members’ assessment of staff’s value to their work. The substantive skills of CAMBIO staff were highlighted by six Steering Committee members as a key value that CAMBIO brought to members’ work, principally by providing technical expertise in key campaign areas, and legislative guidance and contacts that members would find it difficult to attain on their own. The Campaign Manager’s prior campaign experience, strategic thinking, and understanding of points of leverage were mentioned by two members. Several members also identified the Communications Manager’s strong writing skills and familiarity with other communications professionals, her background on immigration enforcement issues (including previous work with a Steering Committee organization), her writing skills, and her capacity to develop and execute a multi-faceted communications strategy that exploited opportunities to highlight CAMBIO member issues. Two members stated that knowledge and connections in the field and in Washington brought by the Campaign Coordinator and the Campaign Lobbyist provided important value. Steering Committee meeting minutes also reflected members’ gratitude toward staff for their logistical support of legislative activities, and bringing their Washington contacts to bear for the benefit of members.

In contrast, however, two members believed that the campaign would have been stronger had the Campaign Manager had deeper background in immigration enforcement, and steered the Campaign on a bolder course. Several members expressed disagreement with some of the strategic decisions made by the Senior Strategic Advisor, who they believed did not hew to the type of firm line on enforcement proposals espoused by field organizations. One informant disagreed with the concept of campaign staffing altogether, preferring instead to establish a “federation of like-minded organizations that met in a structured way,” but without a standing staffing structure that this informant believed exacerbated resource competition in the immigrants’ rights movement. [Member]

42 Raynor at 18.
43 Note that, because of the narrow scope and resource limitations of this research project, we did not control for, nor perform a sub-analysis based upon, a number of factors that could have influenced how individual Steering Committee members experienced the value of CAMBIO. These factors could include, for example, the amount of experience that an organization and/or its representatives to CAMBIO had in legislative campaigning in Washington; an organization’s in-house campaign-oriented resources (for services such as lobbying and communications); and its history of working with colleague Steering Committee members and other Washington advocacy organizations. We anticipate that such a sub-analysis would yield important insights into how less-experienced or less-resourced participants could be better supported to participate in a subsequent campaign structure.
Other informants. All six non-member informants who mentioned CAMBIO staffing during our interviews praised it. Two funder informants stated that the Campaign Manager’s campaign experience and background was critical to success in a hard legislative fight. Two strategic partners, both veteran DC advocates, mentioned the critical work of staff in convening members and strategic partners. They complimented staffs’ skill at facilitating common work despite the diversity of backgrounds and opinions within the group, and their willingness to be transparent about successes and challenges.

Two informants singled out the role of CAMBIO’s representatives on Capitol Hill. One legislative staffer stated that having strong Hill representation means that legislative staff have a single point of contact with CAMBIO, which eases legislative staff’s workload. Informants reflecting on lobbying work observed that CAMBIO’s representatives have deep contacts and strong reputations, which are important to success in Washington.

[CAMBIO representative’s] work has been first-rate. You have to be in the room when conversations take place. In order to get in the room . . . it is based in part on personal relationships. It is a combination of selecting your representatives well so you have someone with credibility, and credibility does not derive only from who they represent . . . I think CAMBIO has done remarkably well in being effective. [External informant]

Steering Committee member informants who spoke in depth about CAMBIO’s Border Liaison stated that the Liaison assisted members by fostering information sharing on border issues, helping border groups to pursue collaboration between one another and with other entities, and enhancing visibility of border issues. As one member stated,

[Having someone who understands border reality and politics in DC is really fundamental. We were able to respond in the past, but by the time we responded it was usually a little too late . . . Having someone in DC helped us shift from reactive mode to proactive mode . . . we wanted to make sure we were acknowledged as the experts on border questions by DC groups. [Member]

CAMBIO staff informants and steering committee documents also reflected the substantial strategic and logistical support that CAMBIO staff and consultants provided to border groups and on border-related events in Washington. (See Sections 5.1, 5.2.)

9.2 Convening of Steering Committee Members with One Another, and with Allies

The value of convening was raised a number of times by Steering Committee participants in the May 20th focus group in Washington DC, although convening per se did not feature strongly in our individual interviews with Steering Committee informants. Given members’ statements in other contexts about the value of collaboration with other members, we do not take this as an indication that members discounted the value of convening.

Four external informants, including three colleague Washington advocates and one funder, asserted in interviews that convening on enforcement issues was an important value of CAMBIO. Convening provided advocates with the opportunity to strategize, coordinate Hill activities and other advocacy, and
to understand the nuances of positions and messaging on enforcement issues developed by CAMBIO Steering Committee members and consultants. As one colleague advocate stated:

Convening role is to strategize, and also to give more solid grounding in . . . the messaging and the asks . . . being able to join and be part of deliberations . . . So when someone asks me, I’m more entrenched in border messaging, I’m part of the conversations, I can see on the listservs that two groups disagree on a particular issue, they’re working it out . . . informal cross-pollinating is most successful at moving things. [External informant]

9.3 CAMBIO’s Government Relations/Lobbying Consultants

We obtained a large amount of data about the value of the government relations/lobbying firm, QGA, to both Steering Committee members and other advocates. Much of this data was positive. Some Steering Committee members, however, had a neutral, negative, or partly negative assessment of the value of QGA to their work.

Steering Committee members’ assessment of QGA’s value to their work. On substance, Steering Committee informants reported that QGA was more helpful on CAMBIO issues that implicated fiscal matters, such as state and local enforcement of immigration law and e-verify, than on other issues. Some observers included border issues in the list of issues on which QGA was helpful, and/or immigration detention.

Many Steering Committee members listed aspects of QGA’s service to them that had value strategically and operationally. These included: obtaining and communicating intelligence from Republicans on Capitol Hill, which informed members’ strategy; communicating CAMBIO concerns behind the scenes to key legislative offices with which CAMBIO members didn’t otherwise have relationships; identifying promising Republican targets for meetings; securing meetings with legislative staff, including staff of “key members” (such as House leadership), which was particularly valuable for CAMBIO members that do not have the staffing to schedule meetings in-house; attending many of CAMBIO’s meetings with Republican offices, to set the stage for members’ effective briefing of Republican staffers; synthesizing advocates’ arguments and advising members on language that would resonate with Republicans and not turn them off (for example, substituting the term “values” for “social justice”); and briefing delegations from the field in advance of their Capitol Hill visits. One Steering Committee informant said that, despite the fact that his organization had other lobbyist resources, the sustained attention of QGA specifically on enforcement issues was valuable. In terms of QGA’s value in individual lobbying visits, one Steering Committee member said:

I went to some of those meetings, the QGA Republican lobbyist . . . talked to those guys that I will never be able to talk to . . . He genuinely believes what he was saying about the cost of border policies, finances, lives, troubles created in community, things Republicans care about . . . First, we wouldn’t have gotten some of these meetings, and then some staffers were really persuaded . . . They would have looked at whole package differently if big legislation from the Senate would have come up . . . He was great, he would translate into “Republican-speak.” He made us all of our stuff sound smarter. Made a big difference. [Member]
Participants at the May 20 in-person focus group stated that an indirect value of the CAMBIO political strategists/lobbyists was in educating the Steering Committee about what DC lobbying firms can/will and can’t/will not do – since for many members this was their first experience with a consultant lobbyist. The focus group participants also noted another subsidiary value to members came from the fact that, in contrast to other campaigns that also secured lobbying firm services, CAMBIO’s government relations/lobbyist meetings were open to colleague enforcement-reform advocates. A large number of Steering Committee members felt that this practice was appreciated by many in the broader immigrants’ rights movement. Several said that a Republican strategist/lobbyist in particular added to the “legitimacy” or “credibility” of CAMBIO members on enforcement issues among colleague advocates and on the Hill.

A minority of Steering Committee members provided detailed criticisms of QGA. Four Steering Committee members reported that there was a lack of clarity, among some Steering Committee members at least, about what issues QGA would or would not be called upon to work on. Several members asserted that QGA was less willing to address issues such as criminal-immigration and workers’ rights than they were to work on, for example, state and local enforcement of immigration. One Steering Committee member said,

[There was some tension in QGA in terms of being strategic in this way, is this what CAMBIO members want to focus on? QGA wanted us to focus on people with clean records. How do you balance this with the initial goal, of elevating affected communities? This is always a tension in lobbying, what do you do strategically versus what you believe? That was sometimes challenging. [Member]

We were not able to delve into this issue deeply enough to determine whether individual organizations’ challenges in accessing QGA were due to a lack of strong agreement between Steering Committee members about prioritization of CAMBIO’s bottom-line goals, or strategic differences between QGA and the Steering Committee, or an issue of transparency within CAMBIO about how the scope of QGA’s assignment was determined, or simply a result of QGA prioritizing limited resources.

Several informants were critical of the advice from QGA on their specific issues, although some of these same critics thought that the lobbyists played a useful role to the CAMBIO campaign overall. Among their complaints were that concrete advice from QGA about how to communicate to the Hill on their specific issues was not forthcoming, or ineffective, or showed that QGA was uninformed about the member organization’s issue, or the member organization’s advocacy capacity.

QGA didn’t know how much knowledge and experience our folks had in talking with legislators...some knew those Members [of Congress] very well. We flagged it with QGA, they didn’t take it seriously...They depended on the relationships they had with Republican offices...Our

---

44 One informant stated that the fact that the informant’s organization also participated in other legislative campaigns that utilized outside consultant/lobbyists meant that informant’s organization could help to communicate to fellow CAMBIO members a more realistic sense of what to expect from a Republican lobbyist; i.e., that clients could expect certain process outcomes (being a “door opener”) but not necessarily substance outcomes (“making crim-imm popular”).

45 Please see Section 10.1 for a discussion of strategic alignment challenges.
perception was they were taking easy way out and scheduling meetings they could get without dovetailing those meetings with the shared experiences of our people . . . the work was sloppy in the beginning, and not until the tail end did things began to improve. [Member]

Two Steering Committee members active in a particular CAMBIO substantive area stated that QGA provided only very superficial advice. For example, one Steering Committee member who requested QGA’s advice on talking points for legislation said that the member got back from QGA “generally a few lines about what Republicans thought about,” which meant that the member had to reshape the talking points without assistance.

At the far end of the spectrum, we heard critique from two Steering Committee members that QGA’s advice was at odds with their organization’s perceived issues or institutional interests. (One of these critics was among the group who related that QGA was unwilling to work on that member’s issues.) Challenges relating to QGA’s assistance caused one Steering Committee group to consider whether the benefit provided by CAMBIO merited the substantial amount of time that it spent in CAMBIO activities.

[Our organization’s] priorities didn’t get to the top. It was state and local and border so we were never CAMBIO priorities, but it wasn’t clear how that would impact our access to CAMBIO services. It would have informed me about how to pull back. If we’re not going to be a priority, how will this impact how much time I spend there . . . It’s easy to get your time sucked away. [In DC] everyone wants you at the meeting, but are you accomplishing your goals?\[46\] [Member]

On an operational level, three Steering Committee members serving different constituencies stated that QGA was not useful, or not always useful, in setting up Republican Hill visits that incorporated their particular issues. These Steering Committee members reported organizing legislative visits for their constituencies largely without assistance of QGA.\[47\]

*Other informants’ views about the value of CAMBIO’s government relations/lobbying consultants.* In contrast to the partially mixed assessment of QGA from Steering Committee members, many external informants complimented QGA highly. A handful of colleague DC advocates said that the access to Republican-side intelligence that they received from CAMBIO’s government relations consultants, including “a solid read of what is and is not viable on enforcement . . . what issues Republicans are most dug in on,” was helpful to them in understanding Republican concerns and devising their organizations’ strategies. One veteran advocate particularly noted QGA’s willingness to use its political capital in making the case for limited enforcement in a way that suggested belief in the issue beyond merely being

---

\[46\] It is common for coalition members to weigh the “costs” of the time that their personnel must spend engaged in coalition work against the benefits that membership in a coalition will bring them (such as access to joint resources like consultant assistance). For a coalition to remain successful, it must come down consistently on the “benefits” side of the equation in the minds of its members. Raynor at 18.

\[47\] In our interviews with QGA we did not receive information about substantive or strategic challenges in their work with CAMBIO. In terms of operational issues, from our interview with one QGA informant, who described the heavy schedule of regular CAMBIO meetings, as well as the volume of Hill visits that CAMBIO members requested QGA to set up, we suspect that CAMBIO’s requests may have exceeded QGA’s expectations for its workload under the contract. Further, QGA related some difficulties in getting from CAMBIO members timely detail about attendees that some Capitol Hill offices demand prior to establishing a meeting.
just a hired gun.” “[A]mong all the Republican strategists, I think he was the best at strategy . . . I was impressed that he was willing to suggest things that were not in the . . . short-term interests [of Republicans].” [External informant] CAMBIO staff also observed that QGA’s ability to provide a consistent feedback loop to Steering Committee members about strategies that work and do not work with Republicans was very valuable.

Legislative staff who we interviewed agreed that it was useful to have a government relations consultant who could keep lines of communication open to key Hill offices. The staffers did not have uniform views, however, about whether the specific information that Republican lobbyists garnered during immigration reform consideration in 2013-2014 accurately reflected the state of play on Capitol Hill. One legislative staffer said:

I have been frustrated by Republican lobbyists, not just CAMBIO’s lobbyists. Either they are just passing along the message of their Republican contacts, but it’s not always good information. One of the constant stories of last year, the Republican lobbyists were telling groups something is happening, it will move soon . . . At worst, it was them being gullible, at best uninformed.”

[External informant]

9.4 Communications Resources

Steering Committee observations about the value of communications resources. Data suggest that communications resources (including the assistance of CAMBIO’s Communications Manager, described above) were among the highest-valued services to CAMBIO members. Those members that have limited or no dedicated in-house communications staffing particularly benefitted from the more operations-oriented aspects of communications work. Among the operational benefits of CAMBIO mentioned by informants were the setting up of telephonic briefings, which provided members the opportunity to inform press about what legislation or amendments actually did, and may have attracted some new press to individual members,48 and setting up press conferences in conjunction with activities such as lobby days, as well as helping members prep for those events so that the messages generated through the event would be pushed out further.49

In terms of communications content, a number of Steering Committee members mentioned that BRS messaging research based on polling and focus groups conducted in the early spring of 2013 permitted organizations to develop stronger messages to promote their issues and to talk about difficult enforcement issues in a way that is sympathetic, and demonstrated to Capitol Hill staffers that some protections from enforcement excesses had public support. May 20 focus group participants said that providing “science behind messages” “counteracts A4C gut-reaction on issues,” and helped to raise CAMBIO’s profile as the go-to source for information on enforcement issues. This contrasts with the situation that, according to one informant, pertained before the messaging work:

48 One member noted that media consultants had good contacts, so that when they had briefings they had media participating.
49 An associated benefit of the deployment of communications resources expressed by Steering Committee members at the May 20 focus group was ensuring that “[f]unders understood the need for funding communications work. The comms piece needs to be added for effective advocacy.”
That research provided organizations with guidelines about what to say and what not to say. It’s hard to put a value on it. They’ve been calculating from a gut feeling without benefits of resources or scientific study of what resonates . . . We stopped doing things we learned were not helpful. [The research] gives an opportunity to include their issues in public communications work . . . it’s built credibility, more visibility in the movement. [Staff/consultant]

Members mentioned the value of CAMBIO consultants and staff in drafting as well as placing many op-eds and other articles on CAMBIO priorities.

And some of the pieces placed were real home runs, the piece in Politico by the veterans is the most significant piece that I’ve ever seen on convictions, as close to a game-changer as you can get. And just got a huge response, even some Republican-leaning groups emailed right away, wanted to get involved. This is an issue that’s hard for Dems; even in hearings they say “we don’t want criminals.” [Member]

CAMBIO-produced materials and connections also helped Steering Committee members’ communications products to be promoted as authoritative by others in the advocacy community – such as AFL-CIO utilizing a member’s stories on its advocacy day on deportation.50

Not all Steering Committee members were unalloyed fans of CAMBIO’s communications services, however. CAMBIO’s staff and members did not take the lead in choosing QGA, the campaign’s initial communications consultants, in the spring of 2013, reportedly due to the need to secure communications services quickly. While good op-eds and other materials were developed during this period, several informants stated that QGA struggled with CAMBIO’s positioning. (This is possibly because it was not very clear whether CAMBIO’s overall campaign was intended to appeal to the middle-ground or to progressives. See Section 10.1.) One Steering Committee member stated that the “middle-ground” strategy – exemplified by Hattaway’s messaging and materials developed on the basis of it— was unclear or inappropriate, and reflected a lack of consensus on CAMBIO’s positioning. “This is when CAMBIO’s role became more confusing. Are we just trying to get into mainstream media, or are we trying to get a really important message into media?”51 [Member] One member said that the member’s organization eventually did its communications work outside of CAMBIO, because it felt that, within CAMBIO, its messages were being diluted.52

Overall, however, informants indicated that the content of communications improved in the fall of 2013 when a full-time communications manager came onto CAMBIO staff, and CAMBIO selected a new

---

50 A Steering Committee member said, “[i]n working with labor, with DV groups, then we were more than subject matter experts; we had stuff that they could use in their own advocacy, pictures and statements.” [Member]
51 Three members stated that the replacement of QGA as communications consultants by Fenton was at least somewhat helpful in combating the tendency by outside communications consultants to “water down” Steering Committee members’ messaging. Internal CAMBIO documents expressed an appreciation by CAMBIO leadership of the difficult task of designing messages to that are effective with moderate Members of Congress while still serving the needs of Steering Committee organizations that have constituencies that are much more progressive.
52 In addition, an experienced communications staffer from a Steering Committee organization, who was fairly positive about her experience with communications consultants, stated that the substantive quality of communications expertise from all outside firms varied a good deal depending on the account manager handling the CAMBIO account at any given time.
principal communications firm, Fenton Communications, which reportedly had greater facility in working with progressive groups than did QGA. In partnership with its communications advisors, CAMBIO developed a strategy to target partners and allies with enforcement-reform messaging, and engaged in a rigorous development of social media materials. Approximately half of Steering Committee members who discussed Fenton’s social media work, including the “message of the week” and the infographics created on the SAFE Act, border militarization, due process, and other issues, considered it very valuable, especially for organizations that don’t have in-house design capacity. This strategy reportedly saw some success at penetration into the immigrant-advocacy community, at least when CAMBIO’s largest membership-based organizations participated in digital distribution of CAMBIO-created materials.

**Other informants’ views about the value of CAMBIO’s communications resources.** One Beltway expert opined that the primary value of CAMBIO’s communications work was in providing a place for colleague organizations and communications experts to learn about enforcement issues.

> I don’t see that [CAMBIO] had a major impact on the media . . . I didn’t see the messages going anywhere. Except within the broader [immigration reform] movement . . . [T]hey were able to inspire conversations, create talking points, messaging resources, that sort of thing. It feels like a resource center for those issues in the movement. [External informant]

Five colleague advocacy organizations – three inside the Beltway – felt that CAMBIO’s messaging and messaging materials were helpful to their organizations or their constituencies. Several specifically mentioned the value of infographics to portray complex enforcement issues to legislators and to community members. One field organization advocate stated:

> CAMBIO . . . helped us have a dialogue with the community [on S. 744] . . . really difficult conversations to have with a community in desperate need of relief. With some of the messaging, and tools, CAMBIO really contributed to help us engage the community in that debate . . . [T]he great thing about social media is if done well, and it was done really well by CAMBIO, being able to convey specific, overwhelming confusing pieces of information in visual or and graphic way that impacts people. [External informant]

**9.5 Legislative Resources**

**Steering Committee observations about the value of legislative resources.** Another strong finding in our research was the value provided to Steering Committee members by CAMBIO’s funding and personnel assistance to advocacy days on Capitol Hill, and to members’ other legislative activities. Many organizations participating in our May 20 focus group, as well as at least five Steering Committee members speaking in individual interviews, stressed the great value of having CAMBIO support to fly affected community members into DC, in developing and hosting briefings on Capitol Hill, and the associated planning for lobbying and communications work, particularly since CAMBIO members had few resources to do this themselves.
CAMBIO meeting notes describe, and CAMBIO staff interviews underscored, the level of effort placed by staff and consultants in coaching members on conducting effective Capitol Hill visits; securing, planning, and scripting individual Hill meetings and leading evaluation of them afterwards; and connecting individual Steering Committee members to influential allies, both in legislative offices and in other advocacy organizations, who could reinforce their messages on the Hill. Participants in our May 20 focus group detailed impacts including empowering affected individuals to speak for themselves, media coverage, and legislative offices referencing community members’ visits in subsequent communications.

**Other informants’ views about the value of CAMBIO’s legislative support.** Staff of two colleague Washington advocacy organizations verified that CAMBIO’s ability to underwrite the travel of individuals impacted by immigration enforcement to Washington for advocacy days was important to advocates’ ability to inform Congress of enforcement-reform priorities. Two legislative staffers agreed that the capacity to bring affected individuals to the Hill is important for “pushback” on harmful bills, but that, of course, the proof is in the ultimate legislation.

> Any lobby day is useful. If you don’t do them, people think your issue does not exist . . . bringing along different constituencies . . . is super-helpful. I can see in my conversations with Republicans in the House, they are very aware of issues . . . I question whether they would be as aware if no one was lobbying on the issues. [External informant]

**Section 10: Assessment of CAMBIO’s Challenges, and Future Needs**

This section of the report analyzes challenges experienced by CAMBIO in implementing its work and future needs articulated by CAMBIO members. Brief analyses of specific challenges will be followed by a summarized list of lessons learned. Informants’ recommendations about future needs are discussed at the end of the section.

**10.1 Shared Purpose and Goals/Strategic Alignment**

Literature on effective coalitions finds that such coalitions have a shared purpose or vision \(^{53}\) that binds the members together, and forms the basis for development of goals to implement that purpose, strategies for achieving the goals, and successful common action to implement the strategies. Our interviews suggest that CAMBIO members generally shared a common purpose of reforming immigration enforcement policy. A number of challenges experienced by CAMBIO stem from a lack of uniform member agreement about the campaign’s goals for achieving that purpose, which inhibited agreement on strategies and efficient joint action. This is attributable to a variety of factors described in later paragraphs of this section, including how CAMBIO membership originally was constituted and the speed with which the campaign was required to begin its activities.

CAMBIO Mission Statement, available on its Web site, gives the high-level view of CAMBIO’s purpose:

---

\(^{53}\) The purpose has been described as having two elements: “goal destination” (a clear expression of the results that the coalition desires to achieve) and “value proposition” (why a coalition is the right vehicle to achieve members’ goals, and why this particular coalition is the right strategy). Raynor at 17-18.
CAMBIO is a diverse group of organizations advocating for laws and policies that create a fair system for immigrants to become citizens; bans indefinite detention; allows due process for all Americans; makes enforcement systems accountable; protects civil and human rights; encourages a better border to protect the quality of life in the borderlands, prevents the abuse of vulnerable Americans; and keeps families together.\(^{54}\)

The Steering Committee, in which all CAMBIO members participated, was tasked with establishing ways to realize the campaign’s broad enforcement-reform purpose. Data reflect that Steering Committee members and staff of CAMBIO worked tirelessly from the early summer of 2013 through 2014 to negotiate and refine both strategies for the campaign and activities to implement them.\(^{55}\) It is difficult, however, to discern from these efforts and CAMBIO’s initial documents, the specific goals that CAMBIO sought to achieve in its enforcement-reform work. CAMBIO informants stated that fundamental disagreements about CAMBIO’s goals and strategies persisted throughout the campaign, and that, despite CAMBIO’s benefits to members and policy achievements, these disagreements had consequences for operations and mobilization. The interview data we gathered from CAMBIO members and stakeholders on the campaign’s goals and desired strategies are complex, and much of them are conflicting.\(^{56}\) We recognize that the following taxonomy will not perfectly reflect differences between CAMBIO members on these issues, but we offer it as a place to start to understand challenges for future campaigns.

**Goal question: CIR, or holding the line on enforcement?** One potential way to achieve the goal of enforcement reform could be through enactment of comprehensive immigration reform legislation. CAMBIO’s mission statement begins with an affirmation of the need for a pathway to citizenship. The interview and documentary data does not reflect, however, that CAMBIO members or supporters were uniform in a belief that achieving the full panoply of CIR was a paramount goal of CAMBIO, although individual members had positions in support of legalization and/or citizenship.

In interviews, several CAMBIO members expressed their understanding or desire that CAMBIO work to achieve specific enforcement-reform goals, independent of the debate in the larger immigration-reform community about pathway to citizenship. For example, one member, speaking of challenges in working with QGA, stated:

They talked a lot about CIR, and many of these groups said “no, we’re not in this for CIR, what we really want, we’re pushing for accountability and oversight.” If QGA had known that this was a different entity, they may not have agreed on this contract. [Member]

Several members went further, with one expressing the view that issues of citizenship are “red herrings” that deter members from concentration on enforcement reform, and another suggesting that an

\(^{54}\) http://cambio-us.org/home/.

\(^{55}\) We did not investigate the extent to which CAMBIO’s decision in the fall of 2013 to concentrate its efforts on border and SAFE act issues impacted the participation in or attitude toward CAMBIO’s strategies by organizations whose priorities were de-emphasized. On the data we have, such a correlation is not present.

\(^{56}\) In describing these challenges, we caution that this is a topic on which the views of informants, particularly Steering Committee members, probably evolved over time.
Anita Khashu and Kathleen Sullivan, Consultants
November 2014

unexpressed desire to obtain CIR on the part of many CAMBIO members impeded rigorous push-back by CAMBIO on bad legislative enforcement proposals.57

Strategic position: “middle of the road” vs. “left flank.” Interview data, and internal strategic documents from the end of 2013, reflect that campaign leadership viewed CAMBIO’s primary objectives to be moving Republicans and moderate Democrats to support common-sense enforcement reform, spotlighting the positions of CAMBIO’s legislative champions, and ensuring that enforcement reform was not marginalized in immigration reform legislation.

Internal documents go on to recognize, however, that many CAMBIO members are progressive, or “left,” and that agreement on legislative compromises on enforcement issues therefore could be difficult to achieve within the Steering Committee. And, indeed, other data indicate that explicit agreement was not reached on whether CAMBIO’s main objective was to educate the legislative “movable middle” about enforcement reform, or whether CAMBIO was intended to stake out a position “to the left of” more “mainstream” advocates, such as A4C (because, among other things, the mainstream advocates would be asking less on enforcement-reform, or conceding too much). Many CAMBIO members and supporters had specific expectations about CAMBIO’s strategic positioning when they joined the campaign, and, while some preferred a more centrist strategic approach, others reported having expected or favored a more progressive approach.58 One member said,

When we joined the Steering Committee, my understanding was that CAMBIO would be a counterweight to the traditional voice on immigration reform, which is focused on citizenship and immigration, and we would talk about tougher issues . . . the clear voice that wouldn’t take the traditional position . . . I will say that proved to be challenging at many points. Many people didn’t understand whether the identity of CAMBIO was trying to appeal to Republicans or trying to be true to our understanding of our issues, even if it were a left-flank position. That changed over time. It became more clear as we did work in the House, we were not a left flank. I’m not clear when [that] decision was made. [Member]

Several informants identified that the de facto choice of CAMBIO to pursue the “movable middle” strategy favored utilizing the voices of policy experts. They believed that it therefore sidelined affected populations, and harmed the ability of CAMBIO to mobilize the field effectively, or to achieve everything on enforcement reform that the political moment would have permitted. One such critic maintained that the “movable middle” strategy was unnecessarily timid, because enforcement-reform advocates were enjoying clear wins in the states on issues such as detainer reform.

57 A lack of apparent clarity on this highly complex and strategically important issue appears to have resulted in the need for multiple member meetings in the spring of 2014, as advocates discussed with the administration acceptable trade-offs for additional administrative relief.
58 It was outside of the scope of our project to investigate whether a more progressive strategy would have been the better strategy to pursue. One CAMBIO supporter, while recognizing the disconnect among members, made a cogent defense of the de facto “movable middle” positioning: “CAMBIO might have added something to have an organized left flank, but actually the space they occupied, where no one was getting enforcement issues into high level chambers of power. Providing information to legislative staff on what provisions would mean. That was more clearly an added value. If CAMBIO didn’t do it, there might have been piecemeal, it was a new and different contribution. The left flank had short term value, but that already was happening.” [External informant]
Legislative work only, or legislative plus administrative. CAMBIO’s mission statement and other organizing documents imply but do not squarely state that CAMBIO would undertake legislative work only – although other data underscore that, from its earliest meetings, the campaign initially was understood by members to be legislative and time-limited. CAMBIO Steering Committee minutes and other corporate documents from the late fall of 2013 through early 2014 (the period during which prospects for comprehensive reform legislation appeared to be diminishing) reflect the membership’s efforts to build consensus on whether CAMBIO should support Steering Committee members’ administrative reform efforts and/or efforts to limit enforcement through the Congressional appropriations process, in addition to working on immigration reform legislation.

A number of CAMBIO members were critical of a CAMBIO mandate that extended beyond immigration reform legislation specifically. Several members appeared to oppose a non-legislative-reform mandate because they believed that legislative reform was necessary and still possible. Some of the critics of CAMBIO engagement in administrative work on the Steering Committee also were those most deeply engaged in their own administrative reform efforts. One informant speculated that some critics’ reticence to have CAMBIO involved might have been due to critics’ view that CAMBIO’s positioning on administrative reform would be too middle-of-the-road. Several advocates outside of CAMBIO were critical of CAMBIO’s decision to support advocacy activities other than immigration reform legislation because they thought that other Washington groups were already addressing administrative relief adequately.

Member coordination or action-oriented. Data reflect that most CAMBIO members valued CAMBIO as an entity that affirmatively provided services to a community of enforcement-reform organizations. This was either because they determined that concerted efforts on enforcement-reform would be more effective than going it alone, and/or because they valued one or more aspects of CAMBIO services that, realistically, they only expected to have available to them through membership in the collective. Long into CAMBIO’s existence, however, interview data and Steering Committee minutes show that not all members believed that CAMBIO should be pursuing its own workplan, and, in fact, that a small minority strongly preferred CAMBIO’s role to be limited to fostering communication between members and/or convening members periodically. Despite the lack of clarity on this issue, CAMBIO data and documents showed that members both worked hard to find alignment on specific initiatives, and tried as an entity not to take positions on specific proposals where doing so could get in the way of individual members’ advocacy.

Impact of this lack of alignment on CAMBIO’s implementation of lobbying and communications strategies. Concerns and criticisms about the campaign’s lobbying and communications services, described in depth in Sections 9.4 and 9.5, seem fundamentally to be about goals and objectives that these services were intended to further, and, to a lesser extent, planning/control/supervision of

59 One Steering Committee member that was critical of CAMBIO stated, “If each member were to have its own [campaign] resources, then of course it would have been better.”
60 A couple of external informants from various corners of the immigration reform movement also questioned whether existing structures (including FIRM, or existing informal coordination mechanisms of Washington-based enforcement-reform advocates) could not have filled the member-coordination role.
consultants. The lack of express agreement on whether CAMBIO was intended to secure reforms to immigration enforcement or something else, and whether CAMBIO was to be “middle of the road” or more progressive, appear to underlie many of the concerns we heard about CAMBIO’s communications and lobbying services. Concerns included how QGA determined which of CAMBIO’s issues it would prioritize and which it would de-prioritize in its legislative work, and whether QGA received sufficient oversight from the campaign in terms of its prioritization and work-plan.

In terms of communications, in the absence of uniformity about CAMBIO’s advocacy goals, CAMBIO members with more progressive constituencies and interests were frustrated with the campaign’s communications products at certain junctures, believing them to be too middle-of-the-road, particularly for affected communities that were seeking more. Several informants expressed concern that lack of clarity in goals also resulted in CAMBIO messaging being divided between more “mainstream” messaging for some audiences, and more progressive messaging for the base. This likely would be a difficult process for any communications firm to navigate. As one external informant stated:

One of the critiques I have of them: I felt that they didn’t really know who they were trying to talk to who their audience was. The value in the research was what the mainstream “Average Joe” person thinks about these issues. But . . . a lot of it won’t appeal to the base . . . The “message house” documents that they used . . . went through many revisions . . . These messages were not useable by their base. In the end they needed two different versions for two different audiences. They felt very base-oriented . . . And the base did use it. But veered from what they were aimed at. [External informant]

Effective alignment among coalition members: an illustration. The What Makes and Effective Coalition study found that a key feature of effective advocacy coalitions is the capacity of members to express clearly the desired results (or “goal destination”) of coalition work. HCAN, a coalition advocating for universal health care, provides a recent illustration of a campaign successfully ensuring alignment amongst members on “goal destination.” According to the summary evaluation report for the coalition, HCAN’s statement of principles, and how it was utilized by the coalition, was a key to the group’s success:

The cornerstone of the HCAN coalition, and the single factor most consistently cited to explain its durability and ongoing cohesion, was the set of principles developed in 2008 – well before there was even a health care bill to debate . . . what makes HCAN’s Statement of Common Purpose significant is that it was actively used in the formation and management of the entire coalition campaign . . . It allowed HCAN to bring together groups and organizations that did not...

---

61 Given time and resource limitations we were not able to delve into a number of fundamental questions about campaign communications, including what audiences (policymakers, field, media) the campaign was seeking to influence and, importantly, with what anticipated outcomes. A comprehensive communications audit would be necessary to determine what the campaign’s communications goals were and the extent to which the campaign achieved them.
62 Raynor at 17.
63 HCAN Evaluation at 24.
64 http://healthcareforamericanow.org/about-us/statement-of-common-purpose/. Note that the principles are not a set of broad statements; rather, they describe in detail a number of positions on health care reform that were hotly contested in the larger reform debate.
trust each other and that may have had disagreements in the past, but could recognize mutual beliefs and goals embodied in the principles.

10.2 Make-Up of Membership

The views of CAMBIO members, staff, and funders about how organizations were selected for membership in CAMBIO were not completely uniform in our interviews. As described in Section 3.5, the campaign principally grew out of a series of conversations between a large group of organizations active on enforcement issues that culminated at the end of 2012 in a proposed “enforcement caucus” with a longer-range advocacy outlook, as well as parallel conversations involving a range of policy-advocacy actors that favored immediate, intensive, campaign-style engagement on CIR. In early 2013, NILC, which had also been talking with colleague advocates about securing support of a communications firm on enforcement-reform, was asked by immigrants’ rights funders to work with participants in both of these conversations to develop a more formalized campaign structure. It was determined that an effective campaign would incorporate the breadth of enforcement-reform advocates both substantively (such as workers’ rights and interior enforcement advocates) as well as operationally (not only policy advocates, but also field-building organizations whose capacities were considered important to advocacy success).

The roster of organizations that constituted the newly formed CAMBIO campaign in the spring of 2013 included most of the original conveners of the enforcement caucus (BHNR, DWN, RWG),65 and organizations such as ACLU and NILC that were long-term central participants in enforcement-reform advocacy in Washington. It also included a number of major base-building organizations headquartered outside of Washington that have substantial constituencies of individuals that would be affected by immigration reform (such as the National Day Laborer Organizing Network and the National Domestic Workers Alliance). These organizations were reform leaders on their substantive enforcement issues, but many had not previously engaged with Washington groups on a comprehensive immigration reform campaign.

Four factors made CAMBIO’s membership selection process controversial. First, for reasons that did not emerge clearly from our interviews, several Washington organizations that are long-time enforcement-reform advocates were omitted from the CAMBIO member roster. This caused these organizations, and even some informants closely allied with CAMBIO, to question their omission, and to express concern that CAMBIO was duplicating unnecessarily some efforts in Washington to convene advocates on enforcement issues. Responding to these concerns reportedly required time and effort for CAMBIO staff and leadership to, among other things, try to ensure that CAMBIO both in words and action uplifted other advocates’ efforts, but did not replace them. It also may have cost CAMBIO some strategic and collaboration opportunities, as well as goodwill and “legitimacy” among fellow advocates, at least at first.

---

65 Several informants stated that The Advocates for Human Rights, an international human rights organization that was a longtime member of DWN and RWG, was disinvited from the final CAMBIO campaign roster. Another stated that The Advocates was not interested in participating in a legislative campaign.
Second, the CAMBIO roster omitted the large majority of the (mostly state-based) enforcement-reform advocates that were constituents of DWN, RWG, and/or the proposed 2012 enforcement.\textsuperscript{66} When RWG closed its doors later in 2013 due to lack of funding, its closure was among several reasons that critics of CAMBIO, including but not limited to former RWG members, used to argue that CAMBIO took away funding from field-based or field-support groups.\textsuperscript{67}

What happened there reinforced the notion from grassroots organizations that DC-based politics will ultimately destroy the base. It left us without a core group [RWG] that saw the value of CAMBIO . . . There was no communication to the enforcement world that RWG was dissolving . . . no organizational letter to say “this is what happened.” Then I think that because a lot of CAMBIO work is focused on border and interior enforcement, it just seemed like a choice between one or the other. [Staff/consultant]

Third, the lack of transparency about which organizations were invited to CAMBIO and which were not fueled a persistent view that CAMBIO was a vehicle that foundations established for their grantmaking convenience, possibly without regard to strategic considerations. We note, however, that we found no objective evidence that CAMBIO itself was, or was intended to be, a direct funding vehicle for individual organizations. Several informants stressed that funding for individual organizations’ enforcement-related work was in fact not tied to CAMBIO membership. This reality did not quell the perception, however. (This is separate from the question of whether the existence of CAMBIO helped foundations to make the decision to provide campaign resources to enforcement-reform work, as opposed to other aspects of immigration reform. We received information from informants that foundations allocated immigration reform campaign funding to enforcement reform due to the existence of the CAMBIO mechanism. These informants stated that, without an enforcement-reform campaign mechanism, this funding likely would have gone to other immigration-reform CIR-related campaigns.)

Fourth, it is at least arguable from the data that certain organizations joined and/or remained in CAMBIO despite reluctance to work closely with other members, or, in at least one instance, a disagreement about the desirability of a staffed campaign that supported both policy-advocacy organizations and base-building organizations to have co-equal seats at the table. It seems that one or more critics remained because they perceived that CAMBIO was the “immigration funders’ vehicle,” and that their policy influence or access to resources or leadership reputation would diminish in some way if they were invited to the campaign and declined, or accepted and later formally disengaged. As one CAMBIO Steering Committee member said,

To the degree that groups are put together by the funders, that’s a challenge . . . People’s perspective from the first meeting, “the way the money comes to this is that we all sit at this table and try to figure out how to do it.” The dinner party is set that way. Even if people would have made the same dinner party themselves, the atmosphere suffered from that. [Member]

\textsuperscript{66} One informant stated that 32 organizations, including state coalitions and local enforcement-reform advocates, were involved in the first enforcement caucus/enforcement-reform meeting in late 2012.

\textsuperscript{67} Although several informants suggested that funders should have reiterated more openly to CAMBIO members that no such trade-off occurred, we conclude on the data that foundations could not have discussed their funding strategies in an open forum.
Certain of these challenges appear to have been ameliorated by actions taken by CAMBIO. One was the admission of IJN, UWDN, and the Northern Border Coalition to membership in the later spring of 2013. A second important factor was CAMBIO’s practice of collaborating well with other enforcement-reform colleagues, and providing colleague advocates with access to update briefings from CAMBIO’s legislative strategists and other helpful resources. The creation of a body of strategic partners early in 2014, including AILA, NIJC, and LIRS, provided partner organizations with even greater access to CAMBIO information, and appears to have reconciled at least some critics to the fact of CAMBIO.\(^{68}\) One challenge was not resolved: Several organizations that were viewed by at least some of their colleagues as not collaborating well within the campaign continued to participate in CAMBIO, despite important strategic differences with other CAMBIO members.

**10.3 Set-Up and Launch**

Campaigns such as Alliance for Citizenship (a successor to earlier immigration-reform campaigns) reacted rapidly to the possibility of immigration reform legislative activity, and had structures in formation and funding proposals ready to submit to funders in the fall of 2012. Enforcement-reform organizations, in contrast, did not coalesce around a campaign-specific structure that foundations were willing to support until February 2013, when plans for reform were well underway on Capitol Hill. The delay in establishing an agreed-upon structure reportedly made it impossible for grantmakers, consistent with their funding processes, to allocate a portion of their resources reserved for immigration reform campaigns (particularly (c)(4) resources), to CAMBIO in time to have a full campaign structure in place by the start of the US Senate’s CIR consideration in April 2013. The CAMBIO Campaign Manager came on board in mid-March 2013. Also in early 2013, polling by Belden-Russonello, and QGA’s communications services, were secured by CAMBIO member organizations through non-campaign funding provided by an individual foundation funder, but the full complement of messaging tools and lobbying support were not available until after S. 744 consideration was completed. This meant that valuable pre-legislation planning was unavailable to the campaign.\(^{69}\)

Several informants expressed strong frustration that foundation funds were not made available more quickly to CAMBIO when the need for enforcement-related funding, in their view, should have been obvious and planned-for, and that engagement of local enforcement-reform advocates would have been more seamless and effective if a gap had not existed between in-person meetings of the enforcement caucus groups in late 2012 and the full launch of campaign activities several months into 2013. Several Steering Committee members said that the securing of communications services before CAMBIO membership could develop a common policy strategy meant that early communications services were not as attuned to CAMBIO members’ needs as they should have been in the spring of 2013, nor as well-deployed in the crucial S. 744 fight, and perhaps not as accountable to the campaign as they were to the funder that underwrote them. A number of informants, however, recognized that delays and missteps

\(^{68}\) CAMBIO Strategic Partners participated in many aspects of CAMBIO activities. The two roles that Strategic Partners did not play in CAMBIO was voting officially on CAMBIO decisions, and heading up CAMBIO Working Groups, although they participated in both Working Groups and issue/policy tables. *Cambio Roles and Structure* (undated, 2013).

\(^{69}\) As described in Section 4.1, however, Washington-based advocates actively were undertaking enforcement-reform advocacy in the absence of a campaign structure.
may be inevitable the first time a group of organizations comes together in a campaign structure, and specifically contrasted the comparatively rapid launch of the A4C campaign, the members of which had been through campaign launches before.

10.4 Group Dynamics

Difficulties in group dynamics led to problems for CAMBIO that are described in prior paragraphs, including the speed and ease with which CAMBIO could plan and undertake its activities. *What Makes an Effective Coalition?* suggests that group dynamics or cultural characteristics commonly found in healthy coalition structures include “trust” and unity of “voice.”70 With respect to trust, these experts state that “effective coalitions foster trust between members and work hard to maintain that trust through transparency, communication, and inclusion. It generally takes time, resources, and effort to effectively build trust.”71

Many informants underscored that lack of trust between CAMBIO members led to members experiencing difficulties in working with others in the coalition. Factors that informants identified that led to a trust deficit in CAMBIO included a lack of prior working relationships with diverse members of the coalition and prior familiarity with their institutional concerns and objectives, and the lack of time and resources to build trust and solidify communications with unfamiliar colleagues, due, in great part, to how quickly the campaign was constituted. “Some groups had no relation to other groups, that had an agenda slightly at odds with the other groups . . . As a result, it made it difficult to build a plane while flying. Some groups that had no past relationships, no trust built up, in an area which is really difficult.” [Staff/consultant] Concerns about scarce resources and a lack of certainty about who had access to which resources also may have created challenges in maintaining trust.

Deep strategic differences among members appear to have made it impossible for some members to maintain a high level of trust, speak or act with a united voice, or refrain from lobbying fellow members in a way that led to splintering. This seems to have been particularly true in the latter part of 2013 and into 2014, when changing political realities magnified the existing strategic differences between those organizations that primarily were pursuing administrative reforms and those that held out hope for legislation, and where disappointment and frustration made feelings more raw. When several leaders of CAMBIO organizations that were longtime veterans of immigration policy-advocacy departed their organizations, other veteran leaders within CAMBIO were spread very thin, and did not have sufficient time or resources to devote to maintaining unity in the face of disagreements.

10.5 Group Ground-Rules

Experts have observed that an important element of leadership capacity of a coalition, related to strategic alignment, is a formalized set of rules and procedures for how coalition members will act and relate to one another.72 CAMBIO’s *Structure, Process, and Decision-Making* document set out rules by which members were expected to conduct themselves during campaign meetings. The document also

---

70 Raynor at 29-31.
71 Raynor at 31.
72 Raynor at 16-18.
set out a general consensus decision-making structure for CAMBIO decisions on legislation and amendments. Other important operational issues arose during the campaign that created controversy, however. These would have benefitted from a more explicit agreed-upon process.

One such issue that was highlighted in informant interviews and reflected in CAMBIO Steering Committee documents was decisions about who represents CAMBIO interests at key briefings or meetings on Capitol Hill, or with the administration. CAMBIO documents reflect that, in several situations in which decisions needed to be made quickly, the processes that were in place were not adequate to ensure that all CAMBIO members had confidence in how decisions were made (or processes were in place, but broke down under time pressure).

A second such issue was a process for organizations to be dismissed from membership. This became critical over time in the eyes of some staff and Steering Committee members, when certain CAMBIO members’ interests diverged from others’ to the extent that they were no longer constructive participants in the campaign. The disruption this created was difficult and time-consuming for other members.

10.6 Meetings of Steering Committee Members

Coalitional structures are inherently complex to manage, and those operating in the compressed timeframes of a campaign are more so. Even understanding that, the number of meetings in which CAMBIO Steering Committee members often participated before action could be taken on important issues was substantial. Multiple meetings and related transparency issues were the principal operational criticisms of CAMBIO that emerged from informant data.

The need to have multiple meetings to make decisions appears to have harmed CAMBIO in four ways. First, and most obviously, it inhibited CAMBIO’s ability to respond quickly in a rapidly moving campaign environment. Second, it required the staff of Steering Committee members to extend themselves beyond reasonable workdays and hours to keep up with their CAMBIO work and their other obligations. Third, the need for multiple meetings to reach consensus meant that, inevitably, decisions on a particular issue evolved from meeting to meeting. Despite the fact that the campaign appears to have done an excellent job of circulating complete meeting minutes in a timely manner, those members who were not present at a key meeting juncture, and who did not review the meeting minutes in a timely fashion, were left without confidence in the integrity or transparency of the process, and some therefore became less likely to participate rigorously in the campaign.

---

73 This appears to have been amended by the Steering Committee in subsequent meetings to provide for majority voting by the Steering Committee on legislation based upon recommendations of a rapid response team.

74 An important issue that was touched upon by one informant only – and thus not analyzed by us – is the “ownership” of resources designed by and for the campaign during its lifespan. These could include communications materials, Web sites, lists of supporters and contributors, etc. Campaign members’ MOUs should express their agreement about how those resources (which will represent, among other things, the joint work of coalition members, and could incorporate work product of individual organizations) will be allocated or disposed of when the campaign ends.

75 “Coalitions are a central component of policy/advocacy work . . . by definition, coalitions represent a set of relationships, which can be complex, inefficient, and mired in managing process.” Raynor at 4.
I don’t think that decisions were always communicated to groups who missed the important Steering Committee call when decisions were made. When people are skeptical about how decisions are made, there’s hesitation to be involved, to invest time and resources in the coalition. [Member]

Fourth, for some groups, the time commitment of multiple meetings may have created a dynamic where those organizations that had a DC presence or were able to take a leadership role felt more like “insiders,” and those that did not felt more like “outsiders.”

We believe that the multiple meetings problem largely can be explained by lack of strategic alignment within CAMBIO and insufficiently explicit ground-rules for consideration of key issues. Several informants generally offered this assessment during interviews. A second and related issue according to a small number of informants was the lack of consistent participation in CAMBIO deliberations by sufficiently senior members of CAMBIO organizations, which may have impeded members’ ability to make timely decisions on important issues.

10.7 Resources

When we asked about the costs and benefits of CAMBIO to member organizations and whether the members would be willing to work in a campaign structure again, the majority of them stressed that they and their organizations suffered due to the very high number of hours that they dedicated to CAMBIO work (which some of them were not specifically funded to do). One member organization compared its participation to be equivalent to “staffing” the campaign side-by-side with paid campaign staff. Two members specifically said that their participation was equivalent to dedicating a three-quarter-time staff position. Several members described conflicting feelings about not wanting to shirk responsibilities to colleagues, while still feeling obligated to preserve their organizations’ capacity to complete their core work and respond to inevitable immigration crises and emergencies unrelated to CAMBIO tasks.

It was unavoidable for us to join CAMBIO, but when we had strategic conversation at [our organization], our mantra was “don’t play first chair.” And at the end we ended up doing that, first chair and last man in the bandstand. It was a learning experience for me; that at some point you need to pull back if it is going to cost the foundation of your work. It did cost us and we’re spending some time recuperating. [Member]

Non-member informants identified that the lack of reliable ongoing resources for the campaign was a serious problem that impeded the campaign’s momentum and endangered its readiness. One member from a major Washington advocacy organization added that, when campaign institutions are discontinued, institutional memory is lost and a good deal of time in the next campaign must be dedicated to getting members up to speed on what has happened before.


10.8 Field Work

Field work was identified by a number of informants as being an area of strategy in which CAMBIO faced significant challenges that it was unable to meet in any substantial way. The limitations of this review make it difficult for us to make many recommendations about field work, but we can offer some observations.

Campaign staffing. It became apparent in the early weeks of the campaign that staffing would need to be dedicated to working with the field because existing CAMBIO staff did not have the needed capacity to take on field work in addition to their other obligations. A highly regarded staffer was hired to manage CAMBIO’s field work, but not until early fall 2013, when immigration-reform activities were well underway. The lack of dedicated staff early on in CAMBIO’s existence impeded its success in field work.

Field capacity. We understand that CAMBIO’s funders had an expectation that field engagement would come principally from CAMBIO’s field-based Steering Committee organizations that could deploy their membership in support of CAMBIO efforts, and from organizations that received foundation grants in the first part of 2013 at the informal recommendation of CAMBIO. By the fall of 2013 when CAMBIO was staffed to work specifically with base organizations, several larger CAMBIO members with bases had shifted their energies away from the core legislative work of CAMBIO, or otherwise did not wish to incorporate their work actively into CAMBIO’s. In addition, the resources provided to field grantees were not specifically tied to participation with CAMBIO. It is unclear on our data whether these grantee organizations prioritized CAMBIO-related work collaboration. We understand that groups may have instead put grant funding to other priorities. Without these sources, CAMBIO did not have direct access to the field, and could not have secured this access without substantially greater staffing capacity. CAMBIO therefore turned its field-related attention to supporting education and mobilization of smaller member organizations with field capacity, such as Southeast Immigrant Rights Network (SEIRN) and New Orleans Workers’ Center, and to developing and disseminating information that field groups could use.

10.9 Summary of CAMBIO “Lessons Learned”

Document purpose, goals, objectives, and strategies, in a written “principles” document, and memorialize members’ agreement in an MOU. Building on CAMBIO’s experience, a future campaign should anticipate insofar as possible the opportunities and minefields that a campaign is likely to encounter. It should set out, in a written principles document, specific ways of addressing these, including the campaign’s purpose, overall goals (enacting CIR vs. enforcement reform?), overall strategic positioning (middle, left, or something else?), and substantive issues that will and will not be worked on by the campaign, so members know what to anticipate in terms of benefits to their organizations (for example, if the goal is to enact CIR, how do immigrants and crimes fit in?), and possibly also the anticipated scope of work (legislative advocacy, and/or administrative work) that they will or will not engage in. It also should include a formal method for amending this document.

The campaign should consider requiring that members sign an MOU attesting to their agreement with the campaign’s principles. Gaining members’ up-front agreement through the MOU process should help
ensure that campaign meetings concentrate less on building and maintaining alignment and more on doing the work.

Select members whose goals and interests are aligned with the principles. The membership goal of the next enforcement-reform campaign cannot be to build a big tent. Members must have both a shared purpose for coming to the table and a common understanding of why they and other participants are at the table. The membership in any subsequent campaign therefore should be determined on the basis of clear strategic alignment, and agreement to adhere to the goals, strategic positioning, and scope of work of the campaign, as discussed above.

Diversity of expertise and background in membership is desirable from a strategic standpoint, as long as the campaign contemplates that it can fulfill the advocacy needs of all members at an agreed-upon level. Funders of the campaign should scrupulously avoid the actuality or appearance that the campaign is a funding mechanism for individual organizations, or that an organization’s strategic decision not to participate in the coalition lessens that advocate’s access or influence.

Establish ground-rules for decision-making and relationship-management. To help ensure that members’ time is well-utilized throughout the campaign, campaign members must anticipate day-to-day decisions that are likely to be contentious (such as selection of members for attendance at Hill or other meetings, and how to respond to issues or requests that are outside of CAMBIO’s purpose or priorities) and establish an agreed-upon methodology for deciding them, so that they are not overly time-consuming to resolve in practice. Members should come to agreement both about how meeting decisions are communicated and how they will keep themselves informed (i.e., by engaging in meetings regularly, and reading meeting minutes in a timely fashion). The campaign’s ground-rules must articulate with specificity what the obligations of membership are, and what conduct is not acceptable for members.

Establish a mechanism for members to discontinue participation. Members of the campaign must be aware that the time might come when the current strategies or activities that are central to meeting their individual objectives cannot be pursued by the campaign, due to evolving political realities, insufficient resources within the campaign, or some other change in circumstances. Members must acknowledge when they join the campaign that, if such changes occur, they will take concrete steps to address them (including by, as relevant, working with colleagues to secure additional resources, stepping out of membership, etc.).

---

76 An effective coalition must be action-oriented, and, therefore, coalitions must have the appropriate balance of effective deliberation and action. Raynor at 19.
77 CAMBIO was successful at doing this in several situations ad hoc. For example, CAMBIO’s Steering Committee determined that when approached by friendly legislative staff for assistance in developing compromise language on harmful legislative proposals, CAMBIO as an entity would not provide alternative language, but reaffirm CAMBIO positions on enforcement. CAMBIO would then direct legislative staff to CAMBIO members with relevant expertise who could provide the assistance if they so chose.
78 One of the key “adaptive capacities” of a coalition is providing frequent and productive communication which is clear and explicit. This is central to building trust among coalition members and between members and the coalition structure. Raynor at 25.
 Invite non-members to be “Strategic Partners” as appropriate. Those enforcement-reform organizations that do not fully embrace the shared goals, strategic positioning, and ground-rules of the campaign, or are not generally oriented toward intensive collaborative work, but nevertheless wish to collaborate on a more ad-hoc basis, might be invited to participate in another capacity, such as the “Strategic Partner” designation that CAMBIO added after the campaign was underway. As one CAMBIO Steering Committee member put it,

[t]he trouble we created ourselves by choosing Steering Committee based on their organizational priorities vs. a shared dedication to what campaign would have accomplished . . . If I were starting over now, I . . . would have a Steering Committee that really has a clear and shared vision of what the campaign is how it would move. And then I would invite others to participate in another capacity. [Member]

“Strategic Partner” designation also seems well-designed for organizations that have multiple focuses in immigration-reform policy that include but are not limited to enforcement-reform. The rationale for the distinctions between the categories of “Steering Committee Member” and “Strategic Partner” should clearly be articulated in campaign organizing documents.

 Support members in building connections and trust. Time for diverse organizations to get to know fellow member organizations and their staff is essential. As soon as possible – in anticipation of a campaign, and before campaign activities ramp up – Steering Committee members must be provided the opportunity and resources to come together to build organizational, and, particularly, personal familiarity that can help to sustain cohesion and trust in times of great stress and urgency.

 Ensure adequate funding for staff and consultants. To maximize its impact, the campaign structure must obtain and maintain throughout its lifespan sufficient funding to sustain staffing, consultant, and other services.

 Support members in staffing the campaign appropriately. To ensure that campaign decision-making and work moves forward in a timely and effective manner, it is important that management of member organizations dedicate sufficient staffing to the campaign at a high enough level. In turn, campaign member organizations must receive sufficient support from funders to permit them to staff their participation in the coalition without engendering staff burn-out, or endangering their other organizational work.

 Field-based work needs particular care, planning, and investment. Any future field-based work will require that strategic alignment be established and maintained with key field-based organizations that

79 Raynor at 14.
80 Research on coalition effectiveness indicates that coalitions are most successful when member organizations, as opposed to coalition staff, do most of the “work” of the coalition. Raynor at 28, fn. 18. It also underscores, however, that coalition members are only effective if they are able to dedicate sufficient staffing to undertake key tasks. Raynor at 14. The expending of scarce resources is one of the principal identified “costs” to organizations of coalition membership that organizations balance off against benefits that they receive. Raynor at 18.
are members of the campaign.\textsuperscript{81} It also will require that early and adequate funding be supplied both to field-based organizations themselves,\textsuperscript{82} and to campaign staff who can identify organizations and activities that can be lifted up and support the field in those efforts.

\textbf{Begin campaign planning as soon as feasible.} Enforcement-reform advocates must be poised to form a campaign structure well in advance of potential major legislative activity, and foundations should be better prepared to ramp up quickly to support this work.\textsuperscript{83} The organizations that are formulating a campaign similarly should receive support to research and identify communications, polling, and other needs, and potential vendors, in anticipation of the campaign’s establishment.

\textit{Permit government relations and communications consultants to get to know campaign members well.} To be maximally effective, strategists must be comfortable with the campaign’s strategic outlook, and have the time and capacity to become well-acquainted with the campaign’s membership before policy activities are underway. It is ideal for communications consultants to be on board and participate in development of the policy strategy from the beginning to ensure maximum impact from communications investments, and to have a mechanism for close collaboration with government relations consultants if they are not in the same firm.

\textit{Campaign organizers must be prepared for a wide demand for consultant services.} All agreed-upon campaign issues (for example, detention, or interior enforcement) that are strategically beneficial for accomplishing campaign goals should receive the benefit of the campaign’s messaging, lobbying, or other services, and an effective campaign must therefore be prepared to supply them with some measure of equity. (This does not mean that a Republican lobbyist will be able to deliver on meetings with Republicans on all topics. It also does not mean that lobbyists will not have the ability to choose what topics to prioritize if resources are not sufficient to cover all of them.)

\textit{Campaign members must be prepared to actively participate in strategies that the campaign designs in collaboration with consultants.} To make the most of limited campaign resources, members of the campaign must buy into the campaign’s lobbying and communications strategies. They must make concrete undertakings about how their individual organizations will support strategies (by, for example, promoting and distributing communications content developed by the campaign).

\textbf{10.10 Future Needs}

CAMBIO members had several conversations in late spring 2014 that touched upon what services or resources would be important to continue as the intensive period of immigration reform activity in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} To illustrate this point on the basis of a successful campaign: Evaluators considered HCAN’s robust and adequately funded field operation to be a crucial factor in its success. The HCAN evaluation report recognizes that field campaigns are far more difficult to accomplish than other forms of advocacy, which explains why large-scale national advocacy campaigns do not often establish them. HCAN Report at 4.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Many informants identified the need for a very substantial increase in resources to field organizations and to campaign staffing if affected community members are to be empowered to advocate for themselves, and if field capacity is to be an important tool of future campaigns.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Early planning and infrastructure development was identified as critical to the success of HCAN. HCAN Report at 3.
\end{itemize}
Congress and CAMBIO wound down. Documentation from those meetings and our informant interviews show that there was not uniformity on what is needed in the future. Among the suggestions were:

Convening for information-sharing and campaign-readiness. A space or mechanism for enforcement-reform advocates to convene periodically for information-sharing or strategizing, or to maintain some level of preparedness for future campaigns, is apparent from our data gathering. A minority of CAMBIO members and several external informants supported maintaining the infrastructure currently in place to monitor developments consistently on the legislative and administrative levels or to guard against loss of momentum and focus. Less specifically, in our informant interviews, several Steering Committee members stated that the process of sitting next to an organization with a different focus (such as interior enforcement, or border) helped to create mutual understanding, a sense of shared overall objectives on enforcement, and a willingness to view enforcement issues through a broader lens, that probably would not have happened had CAMBIO work not provided an ongoing need to meet. Although not a strong consensus view of Steering Committee members themselves, this data plus research on how other campaigns have created readiness suggests to us that it would be highly desirable for leading enforcement-reform organizations to engage in some type of ongoing, funded, project or mechanism between now and when CIR or other major immigration legislation is next on center-stage. There are many policy-change, public awareness, or political will targets that could be the basis for a project or series of more modest campaigns that serve both to secure progress on enforcement issues in Washington over the coming years and to maintain collaborative relationships that keep the sector on readiness-footing for eventual CIR-type work.

Consultant services. Several CAMBIO members advocated in favor of continued communications resources or, at minimum, convening of groups to collaborate on communications. A few CAMBIO members and external informants supported ongoing work with government relations consultants/lobbyists in order to take maximum advantage of opportunities with the Administration and/or on Capitol Hill.

Border resources. Several informants specifically advocated for dedicated staffing or consultants in Washington working with border communities, given the momentum achieved in 2013-2014, and ongoing challenges for border groups of having their voices heard in Washington. One Washington-based advocate stressed the need for greatly enhanced public information about the realities and priorities of border communities.

Logistical support. Several smaller CAMBIO members argued that what is needed in the future is funding support to groups that are coming to DC for briefings and lobbying, and some type of coalitional structure that helps DC groups with logistics.
Appendix A: List of Informants

Member\textsuperscript{84}

Andrea Black, formerly \textit{Detention Watch Network (DWN)}

Aidin Castillo, \textit{Immigrant Legal Resource Center}, a member of \textit{Immigrant Justice Network (IJN)}

Adela de la Torre, \textit{National Immigration Law Center (NILC)}

Jose Manuel Escobedo, \textit{Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR)}

Kamal Essaheb, \textit{National Immigration Law Center (NILC)}

Vicky Gaubeca, \textit{Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC)/ACLU of New Mexico}

Marielena Hincapie, \textit{National Immigration Law Center (NILC)}

Margaret Huang, formerly \textit{Rights Working Group (RWG)}

Chris Newman, \textit{National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)}

Lorella Praeli, \textit{United We Dream Network (UWDN)}

Christian Ramirez, \textit{Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC)/Alliance San Diego}

Chris Rickerd, \textit{American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)}

JJ Rosenbaum, \textit{New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice}

Paromita Shah, \textit{National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, a member of Immigrant Justice Network (IJN)}

Silky Shah, \textit{Detention Watch Network (DWN)}

Mariana Viturro, \textit{National Domestic Workers Alliance (NDWA)}

External Informant\textsuperscript{85}

Josh Bernstein, \textit{Service Employees International Union}

Rini Chakraborty, \textit{Four Freedoms Fund}

Marshall Fitz, \textit{Center for American Progress}

\textsuperscript{84} Includes only Steering Committee Members.

\textsuperscript{85} Includes Strategic Partners, funders, legislative staffers, and other external experts.
Michele Garnett McKenzie, The Advocates for Human Rights
Wade Henderson, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
Monica Hernandez, Southeast Immigrant Rights Network
Patty Kupfer, America’s Voice
Dawn Lee, Alliance for Citizenship
Geri Mannion, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Juanita Molina, Border Action Network/Humane Borders
Royce Murray, National Immigrant Justice Center
Brittney Nystrom, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Mayra Peters-Quintero, Ford Foundation
Archana Sahgal, Open Society Foundations
Jen Smyers, Church World Service

We spoke with counsel to one US Senator and one US Representative that are actively involved in comprehensive immigration reform efforts. Given that we have only interviewed one staffer from each House of Congress, we decided not to include their names here in order to protect their confidentiality. We refer to any quotes by either of these informants as “external informant.”

Staff/consultant86

Elizabeth Beresford
Bonnie Hogue Duffy, Quinn Gillespie & Associates (QGA)
John Freehery, QGA
Bill Hamilton, Fenton Communications
Cathy Montoya
Jumana Musa
Karen Narasaki
Crystal Plati

86 Includes staff, independent consultants, and consulting/strategy firms hired by CAMBIO.